

STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROPOSALS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROPOSAL

PART 2

NOVEMBER 13, 1981

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STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROPOSALS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Pell, and Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. We cordially invite our two guests to be seated at the witness table.

This morning the committee is convened for the fourth and final session of our series of hearings on the foreign policy and arms control implications of President Reagan's proposed strategic force modernization plan. In this case, the committee sought out two expert witnesses.

Inasmuch as our hearings were started by Secretary Haig and Secretary Weinberger, both members of the President's Cabinet, it was natural that we should seek out two of the most knowledgeable and devoted men that we could find, who have devoted themselves for so many years of their lives to this very important phase of American policy. We fortunately have two former Ambassadors with inestimable knowledge and experience pertinent to the subject at hand.

The first witness whom we will hear is Thomas J. Watson, Jr., who served as our envoy to the Soviet Union until the beginning of this year. He therefore can provide a particularly perceptive and timely appreciation of Soviet attitudes toward the current state of the United States-Soviet strategic competition.

In addition to that, he served as the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. He also has spent a lifetime in highly sophisticated and technical fields. He is one of the few people who can tell us what has been happening in the last few days in our failure to launch our Space Shuttle. He certainly fully appreciates and comprehends the sophistication of modern weaponry today, which really defies the average person's true understanding of the terrifying power that we have developed and built.

As he has expressed it, there are two buttons, one in Moscow and one in Washington, with the power to annihilate each other and make life inhabitable on this planet. We hope through these hearings to have better enabled the American public to understand and comprehend this subject.

Our second witness is Ambassador Gerald C. Smith, former Chief of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation. Most recently, Ambassador Smith served as Ambassador at Large and special assistant to President Carter for nonproliferation matters. Since his retirement from the Foreign Service, Ambassador Smith has held the position of chairman of the Arms Control Association.

Both Senator Cranston and I warmly welcome both witnesses, who have devoted so many years of their lives to this subject. I think you will continue to do so, so that we can find a rational answer to a problem which could engulf mankind.

All of the transient things we read in the paper, whether it is a flap over David Stockman or Secretary Haig or a problem with the economy or a problem in some part of the world is minimized when you take into account the nature and scope of the problems to which you have been addressing yourselves.

The committee is deeply grateful to both of you for continuing to devote so much of your lives to this particular problem. We look forward to working very closely with you.

We are honored to have Senator Cranston join us briefly this morning. Senator Cranston has taken the lead through the years in the Senate in having informal groups on all sides of the spectrum come in for luncheon meetings aimed at having the Senate of the United States better understand in an informal atmosphere arms control problems.

Senator Cranston, I want to pay particular tribute to you for the work you have done in that area.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Chuck, very much. We are all grateful to you for your leadership on this very vital issue. I am delighted to be able to work with you on it. I am on my way to California, but I wanted to stop by briefly because I have such high respect for the witnesses, two very distinguished Ambassadors and two very distinguished Americans, Tom Watson and Gerald Smith, who have done so much on this very vital matter.

There is no more important issue confronting us relating to our national security and our survival and the survival of the human race—indeed, civilization as we now know it—than the effort to control nuclear weapons.

I thank you for what you are contributing to our effort to come to grips in a reasonable and wise way with this issue.

I picked up your testimonies and will read them with great interest. I look forward to working with you both in the days ahead. Thank you very, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Ambassador Watson, we would be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., FORMER ENVOY TO U.S.S.R., GREENWICH, N.Y.

Ambassador WATSON. Senator Percy, Senator Cranston, thanks very much for asking me to come before this very prestigious committee to talk about the President's strategic weapons program.

The subject of thermonuclear arms has interested, fascinated, and frequently terrified me since I first began to study this subject about

4 years ago, as chairman of the General Advisory Committee [GAC] on arms control and disarmament.

I have always admired the tremendous intellectual effort that went into the development of the atomic bomb, and the fact that it ended the war. But the subsequent senseless arms race has convinced me that controlling this weapon and moving the world back onto safer ground where we have a reasonable chance for survival is far more difficult than the intellectual task of inventing the bomb in the first place.

Mankind indeed has created a doomsday machine and has shown little capability of being able to control it. I have asked myself why is this true, and I have concluded that many of us otherwise well-informed citizens have put out of our minds the basic capabilities of these weapons; their unimaginable explosive power, their ability to make great areas of the Earth uninhabitable, and the absolute accuracy with which they can be directed at targets all over the world.

Once a reasonable person focuses on the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union have these weapons, he can see that they have only a limited usefulness; they can deter either side from launching a nuclear attack and as a suicide threat, they may help deter the Soviet Union from using its land armies in Europe.

Even if one side somehow carried out a 90-percent effective strike against the other side's missile silos, strategic bomber bases, and submarine bases, the remaining missiles and bombs still would be able to destroy the fabric of the attacker's society.

These facts of life should call into question talk of practical uses for nuclear weapons in pursuing limited objectives. But our leaders, upon whom we depend to make judgments about the trade-offs required both in arms decisions and in negotiations, have not been immune to the tendency of the country as a whole to regard the nuclear weapon as just another military tool.

Why is this so? The answer lies partly in the intrusion of "politics as usual" into the life-and-death area of national security. This great society of ours has been built upon the principle of free play of political forces.

No American wants to give up that principle, nor should he. However, I think we have to look for ways to help our free democratic process produce policies which will enable us to survive in the thermonuclear age.

A few weeks ago I suggested the creation of a permanent prestigious group of "wisemen" to stand above politics and to advise the Congress, the President, and the American people on the best defense and foreign policies to insure the survival of our Nation and our ideals. Maybe somebody has a better idea for doing that. Somehow we must find a way to put before the nation all the arguments on these issues.

Unfortunately, those who express their views in public have generally found it safer not to stray too far from the "arm up, stand firm" line. What the country needs to hear, however, is common-sense about how we should arm up, where we should stand firm, and why.

Against that background, let me comment on President Reagan's strategic program. President Reagan has demonstrated a unique

ability to get programs through the Congress. Therefore, it is particularly important in the area of national security that we choose the right programs.

Overall, I welcome the realistic thrust of the President's strategic program. In particular, I think he is right to drop the multiple-shelter plan for basing the MX missile.

Three years ago, the General Advisory Committee carefully examined various forms of this proposal and expressed grave doubt about the advisability of getting into a shell game with the Soviet Union. Subsequent developments have convinced me even more that the plan would lead to a senseless race of warheads and shelters and give us a permanent feeling of insecurity out of fear that the Soviets had somehow figured out how to locate our missiles.

President Reagan has asked the right question: Is there any way to protect land-based missiles? And not having a clear answer yet, he wisely asked for further study of the leading possibilities.

Meanwhile, he has concluded, I believe rightly, that the safest place for our thermonuclear weapons is in submarines. As to the decision to build 100 MX missiles and to put some of them in silos, I have some doubts. I understand the desire to get more firepower, but to concentrate all of that firepower in a few vulnerable silos would present the Soviets with a very tempting set of targets and may therefore be somewhat destabilizing.

While I support the President's decision to pursue the technical feasibility of defending our missile silos with ABM's, I hope very sober thought will be given before going ahead with any program which would require the abrogating of the ABM Treaty. We must carefully examine the impact of our security if both we and the Soviets develop ABM systems and if both sides start building more and more missiles to overcome the other side's ABM's.

While I believe in using submarines as the most survivable way to base our ballistic missiles, I suggest that careful thought be given before putting cruise missiles on our attack submarines. That is one of those steps which could someday come back to haunt us, since cruise missiles on Soviet fishing boats right along our shores would be impossible to verify and could be a time-urgent threat to our coastal cities and installations.

It is important in considering strategic nuclear programs to keep in mind the relevance of conventional weapons in protecting our security. It is in the conventional weaponry that I am most concerned about the Soviet military buildup. And this problem should figure prominently in our military planning.

Without question, we are up against a formidable foe whose traditions are alien to those which are precious to us and who has gone through the centuries and sought safety by expansion and dominating its neighbors.

I do not think our Nation has the desire nor the resources to come to the direct assistance of every nation on the Soviet perimeter which is threatened, nor do I think we should consider extending our nuclear umbrella beyond Europe and Japan. Therefore, we must carefully consider where, under what conditions, and by what means we will help a nation defend itself. And we should make sure that we have the right forces to meet those requirements.

Many Americans still labor under the misapprehension that by building more nuclear weapons we can avoid building up conventional weapons and recruiting the people to use them. That approach is dangerous, as well as unworkable. I hope the President will come to grips with the problem of meeting our manpower needs effectively and fairly.

My own view is that we should adopt at once universal military service for all young people, providing an adequate pool from which to fill our needs for military manpower as well as channeling young people into other forms of service important to our country.

I realize this is a controversial idea. But I urge that it be discussed frankly and openly with the youth of America and with their parents. In view of the events of the last two decades, it is also clear that we need a national consensus as to where and for what our young people might be called on to fight.

Let me turn now to the crucial issue of negotiations, a vital tool for protecting both countries' security. We have in the past missed many opportunities to use negotiations to our benefit. For example, I would remind you of the urging of the members of the General Advisory Committee, under John McCloy's chairmanship in the late sixties, against the MIRVing of our missiles. They recommended that we agree with the Soviets not to take that step.

The recommendation was given lipservice, but was in fact rejected. Most knowledgeable Americans would give a lot to reverse that decision today. Multiple warheads on single missiles have greatly added to the instability we now face. We apparently have not learned the danger in waiting until new programs are underway before trying to negotiate treaties to control them.

I am glad that the administration expects to get back to the table with the Soviets on strategic arms, but I regret that it apparently will not be until next spring. Much time has been wasted.

My recommendation to the U.S. side is to work from the SALT II framework and explore the possibility of further reducing ICBM's, which are the most vulnerable of the weapons on both sides and thus the most destabilizing.

Of course, under SALT II, the Soviet Union already agreed to reduce its total launchers, but in order to get the process back on the tracks, the Soviet Union could be asked to make further reductions. In exchange, the United States could offer to cut back or eliminate, depending upon what it got in exchange, the deployment of the MX missiles. Of course, the United States would be bound by the same numerical limits as the Soviets.

While the SALT II Treaty, as it stands, is regarded by the administration as flawed, nevertheless we have announced our intention of adhering to it as long as the Soviets do likewise. I hope this means the administration regards it as worth a serious and urgent effort to negotiate any feasible improvement and get it ratified.

Above all, we cannot cope with present problems of international relationships on a partisan basis. The issues are too crucial and final.

I hope that we will not pursue a policy of piling delay on delay in the negotiating process, meanwhile depending for stability upon an unratified treaty which we say we intend to honor.

Having dealt with the Soviets to some degree for 40 years, I seriously doubt that delays and the threat of a new arms race will make them more tractable. I urge Americans to take advantage of the window of opportunity to stop the nuclear arms race. It may not remain open much longer.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Watson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. WATSON, JR.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for asking me to come here today to talk about the President's strategic weapons program.

The subject of thermonuclear arms has interested, fascinated, and frequently terrified me since I first began to study the subject about four years ago as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

I have always admired the tremendous intellectual effort that went into the development of the atomic bomb, and the fact that it ended the war. But the subsequent senseless arms race has convinced me that controlling this weapon and moving the world back onto safe ground where we have a reasonable chance for survival is a far more difficult intellectual task than inventing the bomb in the first place. Mankind has created a "doomsday machine" and has shown little capability of controlling it.

I've asked myself why this is true, and I have concluded that too many of us, otherwise well-informed citizens, have put out of our minds the basic capabilities of these weapons: their unimaginable explosive power, their ability to make vast areas uninhabitable, and the absolute accuracy with which they can be directed against targets all over the world. Once a reasonable person focuses on the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union have these weapons, he can see that they have only a limited usefulness: they can deter either side from launching a nuclear attack, and—as a suicide threat—they may help deter the Soviet Union from using its land armies in Europe.

Even if one side somehow carried out a 90 percent effective strike against the other side's missile silos, strategic bomber bases and submarines bases, the remaining missiles and bombs would still be able to destroy the fabric of the attacker's society. In the case of the United States, our surviving missiles would number in the thousands because of our large submarine force on constant patrol. Soviet surviving weapons might be fewer because of their greater reliance on silo-based weapons—unless they launched on warning. In any case, no American president would lightly risk even a few hundred thermonuclear weapons landing on the United States.

These facts of life should call into question talk about practical uses for nuclear weapons in pursuing limited objectives. But our leaders, upon whom we depend to make judgments about the trade-offs required both in arms decisions and in negotiations, have not been immune to the tendency of the country as a whole to regard the nuclear weapon as just another military tool. Why is this so? The answer lies partly in the intrusion of "politics as usual" into the life-and-death area of national security.

This great society of ours has been built on the principle of free play of political forces. No American wants to give up that principle, nor should he.

However, I think we have to look for ways to help our free, democratic process produce policies which will enable us to survive in the thermonuclear age. A few weeks ago, I suggested the creation of a permanent, prestigious group of "wisemen" to stand above politics and advise the Congress, the President, and the American people on the best defense and foreign policies to ensure the survival of our nation and our ideals.

Maybe someone has a better idea for doing that. Somehow we must find a way to put before the nation all the arguments on these issues. Unfortunately, those who express their views in public have generally found it safer not to stray too far from the "arm up-stand firm" line. What the country needs to hear, however, is common sense about how we should arm up, where we should stand firm, and why.

If we don't bring common sense into our thinking process, we will continue mindlessly to build nuclear weapons and the Soviets will continue mindlessly to match or exceed us. One day, through accident, through confrontation and

escalation, or through an unwise bluff unwisely called, these weapons will be used and life in the Northern Hemisphere will be set back to the Stone Age for centuries.

Against that background, let me comment on President Reagan's strategic program.

President Reagan has demonstrated a unique ability to get programs through Congress. Therefore, it's particularly important, in the area of national security, that we choose the right programs.

Overall, I welcome the realistic thrust of the President's strategic program. In particular, I think he is right to drop the multiple shelter plan for basing the MX missile. Three years ago, the General Advisory Committee carefully examined various forms of this proposal, and expressed grave doubt about the advisability of getting into a shell game with the Soviet Union. Subsequent developments convinced me even more that the plan would lead to a senseless race of warheads and shelters, and give us a permanent feeling of insecurity out of fear that the Soviets had figured out how to locate our missiles.

Our military experts came up with the MX-MPS system as their answer to the question they were asked, namely what is the best way to protect our land-based missiles? They did a good job, but were asked the wrong question. President Reagan apparently has asked the right question: is there any way to protect our land-based missiles? And, not yet having a clear answer, he wisely asked for further study of the leading possibilities.

Meanwhile, he has concluded, I believe rightly, that the safest place for our thermonuclear weapons is in submarines.

As to the decision to build 100 MX missiles and to put some of them in silos, I have some doubts. I understand the desire to get more firepower, but to concentrate all that firepower in a few vulnerable silos would present the Soviets with very tempting targets, and may, therefore, be somewhat destabilizing.

I have no comment on the B-1 bomber decision, except that I hope the Congress will examine very carefully the cost effectiveness of building that aircraft.

While I support the President's decision to pursue the technical feasibility of defending our missile silos with ABMs, I hope very sober thought would be given before going ahead with any program which would require abrogating the ABM Treaty. Aside from the political implications of casting aside a central achievement of the arms control process, we must carefully examine the impact on our security if both we and the Soviets develop ABM systems and if both sides start building more and more missiles to overcome the other side's ABMs.

While I believe in using submarines as the most survivable way to base our ballistic missiles, I suggest careful thoughts before putting cruise missiles on our attack submarines. That is one of those steps which could someday come back to haunt us, since cruise missiles on Soviet "fishing boats" right along our shores would be impossible to verify and could be a time-urgent threat to our coastal cities and installations.

It is important, in considering strategic nuclear programs, to keep in mind the relevance of conventional weapons in protecting our security. Although the President's strategic program does not deal with conventional weapons, in introducing it he emphasized that he plans to spend less than 15 percent of the defense budget on strategic forces over the next 5 years. It is in conventional weaponry that I am most concerned about the Soviet military buildup, and and this problem should figure prominently in our defense planning. Eventually it should also figure in our negotiations with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the operational readiness of our conventional forces in Europe, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea should have highest priority.

Without question, we are up against a formidable foe, whose traditions are alien to those which are precious to us, and who has through the centuries sought safety by expansion and by dominating its neighbors.

I don't think our nation has the will nor the resources to come to the direct assistance of every nation on the Soviet perimeter which is threatened. Nor do I think we should consider extending our nuclear umbrella beyond Europe and Japan. Therefore, we must carefully consider where, under what conditions and by what means we will help a nation defend itself. And we should make sure we have the right forces to meet these requirements.

Many Americans still labor under the misapprehension that by building more nuclear weapons we can avoid building up conventional weapons and recruiting the people to use them. That approach is dangerous as well as unworkable.

I hope the President will come to grips with the problem of meeting our manpower needs effectively and fairly. My own view is that we should return at

once to Universal Service for all young people, providing an adequate pool from which to fill our needs for military manpower as well as channeling young people into other forms of service important to our country. I realize this is a controversial idea, but I urge that it be discussed frankly and openly with the youth of America and their parents. In view of the events of the last two decades, it also is clear that we need a national consensus as to where and for what our young people might be called on to fight.

Let me turn now to the crucial issue of negotiations—a vital tool for protecting both countries' security.

We have in the past missed many opportunities to use negotiations to our benefit. For example, I would remind you of the urging of the members of the General Advisory Committee, under John McCloy's chairmanship in the late sixties, against the MIRVing of our missiles. They recommended that we agree with the Soviets not to take that step. Their recommendation was given lip service, but in fact was rejected.

Most knowledgeable Americans would give a lot to reverse that decision. Multiple warheads on single missiles have added greatly to the instability we now face. We have walked blithely across threshold after threshold. And we apparently have not learned the danger in waiting until new programs are underway before trying to negotiate treaties to control them.

I invite your attention to the success which we have had in verifying the implementation of the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. On this score, I urge you to ask Ambassador Robert Buchheim to testify, if you have not already done so. He chaired the American side of the Standing Consultative Commission which monitored potential infractions of the treaties, and I believe his view is that while questions were raised on both sides, each one was disposed of to the satisfaction of both parties.

I am glad that the Administration expects to get back to the table with the Soviets on strategic arms, but I regret that it apparently will not be until next spring. Much time has been wasted.

My recommendation to the U.S. side is to work from the SALT II framework and to explore the possibility of further reducing ICBMs, which are the most vulnerable of weapons on both sides and thus the most destabilizing. Of course, under SALT II the Soviet Union already agreed to reduce its total launchers. But, in order to get the process back on the tracks the Soviet Union could be asked to make further reductions. In exchange, the United States could offer to cut back, or eliminate, depending on what it got in exchange, deployment of the MX missile. Of course, the United States would be bound by the same numerical limits as the Soviets.

While the SALT II Treaty as it stands is regarded by the Administration as "flawed," nevertheless, we have announced our intention of adhering to it as long as the Soviets do likewise. I hope this means the Administration regards it as worth a serious and urgent effort to negotiate any feasible improvements and get it ratified.

After much thought I have concluded that the best path to security is to return to the Salt process. Not only should we seek, as rapidly as possible, Senate ratification of an appropriately altered SALT II Treaty, but we should seek continuation on a permanent basis of a joint U.S.-Soviet group, located in Geneva or elsewhere, not only to continue to negotiate on follow-on arms control issues, but also to be available as a crisis-control mechanism to deal with renewed crises which will undoubtedly arise in the future and which pose the most serious threats to peace.

Above all, we cannot cope with the present problems of international relationships on a partisan basis. The issues are too crucial and final.

I hope that we will not pursue a policy of piling delay on delay in the negotiating process, meanwhile depending for stability upon an unratified treaty, which we say we intend to honor.

Having dealt with the Soviets for forty years, I seriously doubt that delays and the threat of a new arms race will make them more tractable. I urge Americans to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" to stop the nuclear arms race. It may not remain open much longer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Watson.
Ambassador Smith.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted on behalf of the Arms Control Association a rather extensive document. I would merely like this morning to make a few brief observations.

The CHAIRMAN. We will insert the full text into the record, and you may summarize it in any way that you see fit.

Ambassador SMITH. First of all, Mr. Chairman, many thanks for permitting me to appear before your committee to talk about what I think is a vital subject. I would confirm what Ambassador Watson said about the October 2 program, which seems to me to be consistent with SALT provisions. I was pleased to see that. I think it by itself represents a form of control for which the administration should be applauded.

But in order fully to answer the question what are the arms control implications of this program, one would have to know much more about the strategic assumptions on which it is based. The program would increase the power, accuracy, and numbers of our missiles, both land and sea-based. It would, I think, ineffectually try to improve our defenses against Soviet attack, and it pays the usual lip service to the need to protect our people through civil defense.

All of this implies to me that we may be relying heavily on what is called a war-fighting policy which imagines that this country could survive a prolonged nuclear exchange with the U.S.S.R. and go on to win such a war with some significant part of its social and industrial structure intact.

A generation ago, President Eisenhower concluded that neither superpower could win a nuclear war. And no subsequent technological developments have occurred to warrant a different conclusion.

I am inclined to believe statements of world leaders, including Soviet leaders, that general nuclear war would constitute mutual suicide.

The October 2 program does not shed much light on administration thinking about the possible role of an ABM hard-site defense of fixed ICBM launchers. "That needs further study," said the announcement. This may foreshadow a U.S. move against the ABM Treaty of 1972. I am convinced that deploying ABM's in large numbers would be a major destabilizing development.

The ABM Treaty, in effect, ended one-half of the arms competition in ballistic missiles. Abrogation by the United States, coming just after the nonratification of SALT II, would be a harsh setback for any prospects for improving U.S. security through agreements in restraint of nuclear competition.

I understand that, fortunately, no ABM technology is as yet in sight, which would make ABM defense of silos feasible even if it were desirable. But I urge this committee to be alert to any moves against the ABM Treaty, moves which I would consider a most pernicious development.

Now, a few specific personal comments. The B-1 issue involves less a question of arms control than of cost and technical judgments. On balance, I am impressed by the arguments in favor of going ahead

with the B-1 rather than depending on having the elusive Stealth aircraft by any specific future date.

The best that I can say about the deployment of 100 MX's in hardened silos is that it would be less prejudicial to arms control than a mobile system would have been. While the choice of fixed silos suggests that we can safely take a breathing spell in the face of the so-called window of vulnerability, to put these missiles in theoretically vulnerable launchers cannot help but increase destabilizing tendencies.

And I should interject here, Mr. Chairman, that I am not a true believer in the undue Minuteman vulnerability as of the present data. I should add that I see no pressing need for the 100 more destructive and accurate MX's unless we just want to make a start on mimicking Soviet strategy. I understand that some modes of hardening silos could go beyond existing SALT limits, and I trust that they will not be adopted.

I do not understand the need for or logic of deploying a new SLBM, the Trident D-5, especially when the fleet is only just now in the process of getting the first generation of Trident missiles. But since, unlike the MX, the SLBM invulnerability during this century seem assured, the arms control implications of such a deployment are not major, our planners, however, must take into account that our hard-target SLBM capability is likely to be duplicated by the U.S.S.R., thus presenting a new threat to United States forces.

The CQ program seems sensible—with one caveat: if tighter command and control and better communications are aimed at trying to manage the, to my mind, hopeless task of mounting a war-fighting strategy having any promise of success, that certainly would not help lay the basis for a strategic balance which encouraged arms control arrangements.

The proposed anti-aircraft buildup seems to have little arms control impact. However, I wonder about the wisdom of investing resources and treasure which are in short supply to meet the much lesser threat of Soviet bombers while perforce having to remain exposed to the much greater threat from missiles.

Cruise missiles in attack submarines seem redundant to me, and could complicate the verification needs of future arms control arrangements. The administration calls these missiles highly accurate, which suggests a war-fighting role. On the other hand, since these missiles are relatively slow in flight, they do not offer the preemptive strike threat that ballistic missiles do, and therefore would be less prejudicial to future strategic stability.

The October 2 program promises an expanded cost-effective civil defense program. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if this is seriously intended to be an important part of the strategic package. It seems to me that a bow to civil defense was included in this program not with any expectation that it would be mounted in the near term but in recognition of the fact that a war-fighting strategy could not be credible unless backed by a program to "harden" the American people. From past performance, such a program seems highly unlikely of acceptance by the voters.

I would again stress the absence of information about the strategic assumptions behind the proposed new deployments. I think that Con-

gress would be well advised to look carefully into how these new weapons are intended to be used.

In conclusion, I am glad to see the recognition of the value of SALT provisions which is reflected in the administration's proposal. Those proposals seem to present no insuperable obstacles to further progress on strategic arms control. I have reservations about the wisdom of some of the specific measures, especially those that could support a war-fighting policy. And I think a searching inquiry should be made as to the specific needs for these new weapons.

Thank you.

[Ambassador Smith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to thank you for your invitation to address a topic of vital importance. While the Arms Control Association has taken no official position on the subject of the Administration's strategic program, I believe that my remarks are in general consistent with the views of the directors and members of that organization.

My statement covers three aspects of the October 2nd strategic program: its impact on existing arms control arrangements; its relation to American strategic policy; and lastly, specific implications of the separate elements of the Administration's package.

ARMS CONTROL

The October 2nd program appears to be consistent with the provisions of SALT I and SALT II. One might conclude that the Administration tailored its program to stay within SALT provisions. If so, this was a prudent decision.

While there are some elements of the program—such as deployment of cruise missiles—which might affect undertakings made in SALT II or which might make future arms limitation more difficult, for the time being there are no features of the President's program, as we understand it, that would be inconsistent with the continued observance of SALT I and II or the start of new negotiations.

We are encouraged by the fact that, though the program of research and development on ballistic missile defenses is to be continued, no attempt is called for to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 or the 1974 Protocol to that Treaty. Both the Treaty and the Protocol are scheduled for review next year.

These ABM constraints are the most important arms limitation measures of the nuclear age. They restrict to minimal levels the deployment of defensive nuclear weapons and consequently contain the competition in offensive nuclear weapons. They provide for periodic Soviet-American consultations on strategic issues through the little-noted but useful forum of the Standing Consultative Commission, in itself an important product of the arms control process.

I take it from the Administration's announcement of October 2nd and from official statements made since then that President Reagan has no present intention to seek revision or termination of those agreements. This, too, reflects a sensible approach to management of the strategic balance.

In presenting its strategic package, the Administration stressed its purpose to signal American resolve both to adversaries and allies. But the record of trying to use projections about armed forces as vehicles for communication suggests that the message may not be received as it was intended. The signal sent by military strength alone is ambiguous. It can be misinterpreted and generate a reaction which it was intended to discourage.

And the message of resolve may influence audiences other than those for whom it was primarily intended. What message does the Administration's program send to those around the world who are deeply concerned about escalation of the nuclear arms race and who recall the pledges which both superpowers have repeatedly made to halt and reverse this competition.

The Administration plans to begin negotiations on strategic and theater nuclear weapons in the coming months. This is all to the good, both for Soviet-American arms control and as a necessary step in the urgent task of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. But there is little evidence that the Administration has developed an overall plan for controlling nuclear weapons proliferation

or that it appreciates and accepts the relationship between superpower weapons programs and the possible start of weapons programs by other states.

U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY AND PURPOSE

The new program should be viewed in the context of evolving American nuclear weapons policy. As our Traid of airborne, landbased, and sea-based strategic nuclear forces evolved in the 1960's the operational policy for employing those weapons envisaged their use against military and industrial targets. Planning called for the United States to be able to absorb a Soviet first strike while assuring the adversary's destruction in retaliatory strikes, leaving an aggressor no prospect of gain. This policy was termed "assured destruction." And, since we knew that the Soviet Union had forces capable of inflicting great damage on the United States, the nuclear stalemate was often described as a condition of "mutual assured destruction."

As nuclear weapons technology improved, however, it became conceivable to plan for more selective targeting. Technological innovation suggests to some that nuclear war could be controlled to make it safer and less damaging. This notion was also imputed to the Soviet Union, which presumably was grappling with the policy implications of advancing technology.

During the 1970's it became fashionable in some quarters to suppose that a nuclear war would be winnable and that the Soviets were planning on this assumption. If so, some thought that the United States could discourage nuclear threats credibly only by adopting a matching war-winning force and strategy.

These trends in hardware and theory became so pronounced by the end of the last decade as to raise fears about the strength and survivability of our deterrent forces and to make increasingly acceptable in the West a nuclear war fighting strategy. The consequences of these developments can be seen in the nuclear weapons plans and programs advanced by both the Reagan as well as the Carter Administrations.

As we start on the third major nuclear weapons build-up since the dawn of the nuclear age, one should consider the direction of these trends. While nuclear weapons must continue to serve as a credible deterrent, there is a cross-over point where the potential of nuclear forces may provoke nuclear war rather than discourage it. We should try to avoid a force posture and a strategic doctrine that makes resort to nuclear weapons more rather than less likely.

We would do well to remember that war is marked by lack of control and uncertainty. Mountbatten said:

"In warfare, the unexpected is the rule and no one can anticipate what an opponent's reaction will be to the unexpected."

Best- rather than worst-case assumptions are required for a belief that nuclear war can be controlled or won in the sense that anything would be left of the political, social and economic structures of the belligerents.

In examing the Administration's strategic program, I urge you to give paramount importance to the necessity of squelching tendencies working toward making nuclear war seem a winnable proposition. The elements of the new strategic package should be scrutinized in the light of this first principle of any nuclear policy—nuclear weapons are for deterrence purposes. If they are used they will have failed of their purpose.

Lately we have heard much about the vulnerability of our strategic forces. As the number and capabilities of offensive nuclear weapons increase, they become more capable of destroying opposing nuclear weapons. The coming decade will see greater concern about the survivability of nuclear forces, especially fixed land-based missiles, bombers, and command control facilities. Sea-based forces, which have by far the most weapons, should remain highly survivable for a long time.

Recognizing that some part of U.S. strategic forces will become vulnerable to a Soviet first strike is a different thing from accepting the idea that either the United States or the Soviet Union could carry out with confidence an effective first strike against the other's strategic forces. It requires a leap of faith to believe that computer calculations about missile capabilities could form the basis for a reliable disarming attack which would face enormous operational obstacles.

So the implications of this risk of vulnerability should be carefully weighed. There is some danger that strategic programs may be driven by fear of a contingency that no sane political or military leaders would consider. A disarming first strike seems to me as remote as that a comet should hit Washington, D.C. Our plans and policy should be aimed at making it even more remote. But we should also worry about other risks.

AIRBORNE AND LAND-BASED FORCES

We agree with the President's decision to abandon the multiple protective shelter basing scheme. Besides being costly in economic and environmental terms, its potential to withstand a Soviet attack could have been neutralized.

The Administration hopes to increase the survivability of the proposed 100 MX missiles by "super-hardening" Minuteman or Titan silos. But such silos would still be destructible by Soviet missiles, by using its large missiles with a single 10 or 25 megaton warhead, the Soviets could destroy a missile in a silo hardened to any level.

As Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated recently before this Committee, the MX missile is desired to "end the Soviet monopoly on prompt hard target kill capability and thus enhance deterrence." It is *because* the MX has hard target kill capability that it becomes, in theory, a more crucial target. It would seem that to put a highly effective missile in a highly vulnerable launcher would only *weaken* deterrence, not enhance it.

For this reason, we should take a cold hard look at the MX missile. Why is it sensible to match a supposed Soviet first-strike capability? What strategic purpose would this added potential serve?

Our security is likely to be weakened if we and the Soviets together do not find ways to prevent ongoing development and deployment of counterforce weapons, that is, those which are capable of striking opposing nuclear forces with confidence of success. Though these weapons probably affect but slightly the existing strong inhibitions against launching a nuclear war, they could substantially influence the calculus of desperation in a crisis. It is precisely this counterforce capacity which has created the so-called "window of vulnerability." Possessing improved counterforce weapons of our own, such as the MX and Trident II missiles, will not close this window.

Instead, the deployment of more destructive and accurate missiles will make fingers on nuclear triggers more jittery. Such systems may make the possibility of deriving any meaningful gain from nuclear war more remote, but they will make the possibility of an accidental war—one that neither side wants—more likely. The reason is simple: As the capabilities of weapons improve, each side will feel stronger incentives to shoot first in a crisis, if it believes for any reason that the other side may be contemplating a pre-emptive first strike of its own. The logic of "use-them-or-lose-them" could create unbearable pressures on national leaders. Even though they may realize that the result will be destruction on an unimaginable scale, shooting first may continue to seem the lesser of evils.

One of the major objectives of American strategic and arms control policies has been to increase the stability of the balance in time of crisis. The Washington-Moscow "hotline" Agreement of 1963, the Incidents at Sea Agreement, and the Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971 reflect this purpose. Deployment of missiles with the counterforce characteristics of the Trident II missile seems to counter the objective of "crisis stability" and to erode the progress that has been made toward reducing the risk of nuclear war.

While it may be argued that the Soviet Union has increased this risk by increasing the warheads on and accuracy of its landbased missiles, two wrong actions will not produce a right outcome. It is not in the long-term interest of the United States to be the pacemaker in increasing the counterforce capability of missile submarines, some of which already target Soviet missile silos. From experience with improved guidance technology and the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) we should know that any innovation we undertake will in time be imitated or offset by the Soviet Union.

I would like to comment briefly on each of the three options which have been suggested as possible future methods to increase land-based missile survivability.

The first is ballistic missile defense (BMD). It is reassuring to read the sober discussion of Mr. Weinberger and others regarding the abrogation of the SALT I Treaty, which deployment of BMD would entail. As Mr. Weinberger stated, "Any modification to the Treaty must be carefully examined to ensure it is in the net interest of ourselves and our Allies." Only the most compelling arguments and the prospect of solid gains for the national security would justify an attempt to amend or an actual abrogation of the ABM Treaty by virtue of which one-half of the competition in ballistic missiles was ended in 1972. A world where Soviets and Americans were deploying thousands of ABMs will make the present seem to have been a peaceful, stable state of nuclear affairs.

The other two options, "deep underground basing" and "continuous patrol aircraft," should be studied afresh. It seems unlikely that any new reasons to support these rather old remedies will be found.

The Administration's justification for deployment of 100 B-1 bombers is that "There is a general consensus on the need for new strategic bombers."

Bombers do not drive the arms competition. They are a flexible system, recallable once launched, useful in other hostilities than general nuclear war. They are relatively benign from a nuclear arms control point of view. They offer no first strike or counterforce risks. The proper concern in the case of the B-1 is whether it should be built now or whether the present B-52s can carry on until the so-called Stealth bomber can be deployed. This calls for judgments other than those of arms controllers.

SEA-BASED FORCES

The President's program for modernizing the sea-based nuclear force has two parts: (1) development of a new and more accurate ballistic missile (Trident II or D-5 missile) capable of attacking any target in the Soviet Union, including Soviet missile silos, and (2) the deployment of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on general purpose submarines beginning in 1984. The nuclear cruise missiles are viewed by the Administration as a strategic reserve force and are deemed especially useful for hitting Soviet military targets, such as airfields for the *Backfire* bomber, in the course of a nuclear conflict.

By the Administration's own admission, the Trident II or D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a counterforce weapon. The likely consequence of our development of a counterforce missile will be a greater instability of the nuclear balance in a crisis. The same analysis applies to the Trident II missile. We can only expect eventual Soviet production of improved counterforce submarine missiles of its own. It seems unwise, therefore, to pursue a program that will end by putting more targets in the United States at greater risk.

More worrisome still—and less noticed by the public—is the Administration's plan to deploy several hundred nuclear cruise missiles on our regular submarines. If implemented, this program will create an essentially new strategic nuclear force. It is a step which should not be undertaken without the most careful consideration of its grave consequences for our security.

The implications of submarine-launched cruise missiles fall into four categories; we need to be quite clear about what they portend for the strategic environment of the future: for monitoring and surveillance capability; for nuclear war doctrine; and for Soviet programs.

As to the first, it should be recognized that the Tomahawk nuclear land-attack missile (TLAM-N), represents only the first generation of modern cruise missiles. While this missile is regarded as significantly different from ballistic missiles because of its shorter range and slower time-to-target, we should remember that research is already going forward on improved models that will have greater range and a terminal supersonic capability.

From the standpoint of long-range strategic planning, we should be looking at the impact these missiles will have on the strategic environment when and if their numbers increase and their performance improves. It may well be that modern cruise missiles will prove to be the dominant strategic technology of the 1980's and 1990's, as the ballistic missile was the dominant strategic technology of the 1960's and 1970's. Before we enter such a new era in the weapons competition, we should examine all of its ramifications.

Among the most significant of these will be the impact of this virtually new weapon on our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces with high confidence. The modern cruise missile is a very versatile, concealable, and ambiguous weapon. It can be launched from a variety of platforms, including aircraft of all types, trucks, surface vessels and submarines. It can carry either nuclear or conventional explosives. The United States, for example, is also planning to deploy a conventional version, known as the Tomahawk conventional land-attack missile or TLAM(C), and an anti-ship version is also under consideration. Cruise missile launchers can be easily reloaded. Owing to its relatively small size, it can be readily concealed or camouflaged.

All of these characteristics will tend to frustrate the capability that has been developed over the last twenty years to monitor strategic nuclear forces with high confidence. If deployed by the United States the sea-launched cruise missile may create uncertainties for the Soviets that will prompt expanded nuclear weapons programs of their own. If, in time, they also deploy modern cruise missiles at sea, our uncertainty about the size and nature of the threat will also increase.

Deployment of naval cruise missiles will not only complicate the problems of military intelligence, strategic planning, and defense budget, they will also make it far more difficult to monitor any arms control agreements that may be negotiated in future years. Or, at a minimum, they will make it necessary to include in such

agreements substantial measures of cooperation historically rejected. It is too often forgotten that the progress we have made in nuclear arms control to date has depended very importantly on the fact that the weapon systems involved have been relatively very visible to the kinds of surveillance technology that we have developed. This all-important visibility may end with the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles.

The naval cruise missile, therefore, stands a very good chance of increasing the indeterminacy of the strategic threat in the 1980's and 1990's and of undermining one of the key foundations of arms limitation agreements.

At the same time, the particular missions envisioned for these naval cruise missiles—attacking Soviet military and military-industrial facilities after an initial nuclear exchange—give credence to the growing apprehension that the United States is not only preparing to fight a nuclear war but that it is also planning to fight a protracted nuclear war, if such can be imagined. This view is reinforced when other elements of the administration's package are considered. The development of naval cruise missiles, the superhardening of MX silos, and the hardening and redundancy of our command and control facilities all argue for an intent to fight a nuclear war.

It is claimed, of course, that deterrence of nuclear war is enhanced by one's visible readiness to fight a nuclear war if it should become necessary. It is also claimed that one must always be prepared for the failure of deterrence. Each proposition contains a measure of truth. Yet the logic of each can be pursued to the perilous point of self-fulfilling prophecy. As the great deterrent strategist Bernard Brodie wrote: "A plan and policy which offer a good promise of deterring war is, therefore, by orders of magnitude better in every way than one which depreciates the objective of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chance of winning. Of future total wars we can say that winning is likely to be less ghastly than losing, but whether it be by much or by little we cannot know."

Lastly, it would be short-sighted, indeed, if we did not take into account the likely reactions of the Soviet Union to the prospective deployment of naval cruise missiles. Clearly, they will not let the advent of such a new nuclear force pass without response. Two reactions are possible. The Soviet Union may attempt to offset our deployment of naval nuclear cruise missiles by a new or expanded program in another technology of their own choosing. For example, they might decide to increase production of their Backfire bomber and build a companion tanker for in-flight refueling to increase the Backfire's range. Or, they may decide to produce their own modern cruise missiles and deploy them on submarines or surface vessels.

Given the much longer sea-coast which the United States has to defend and our relative depreciation of air defenses over the years, Soviet deployment of strategic cruise missiles at sea would be more advantageous to them than our parallel deployment would be to us. Every Soviet vessel transiting the oceans or calling at Cuban or other South American ports would have to be viewed as a potential strategic threat and would tax the resources of our Navy to the utmost.

No great interest in the modern strategic cruise missile has as yet been detected in the Soviet Union, although an aerodynamic vehicle that appears to be a cruise missile was tested in early 1979. However, we do know that the Soviet Union has the technology base to produce advanced cruise missiles of its own. In addition, if the Soviet Union perceives that the U.S. cruise missile deployment represents a strategic "end run," considerations of their image as a major nuclear superpower will by themselves produce pressures to keep up with the United States in this improved type of nuclear weapon.

It would not be at all surprising if the Soviet leadership came to view the Administration's deployment of naval cruise missiles both as a means of gaining a lead in the nuclear competition and of frustrating the fragile arms control process. I do not like to think what might be the consequences of such a Soviet perception for our nation's future security. Among them would be a redoubled Soviet anti-submarine warfare effort to enable them to defend against our cruise missile submarines and an end to Soviet observance of SALT II.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND DEFENSE

The command, control, and communications portions of the Administration's strategic package reflect the sense throughout the defense community that this aspect of our deterrent forces has been neglected and is in need of refurbishing. Yet it also reflects the growing view that these facilities are perhaps the most vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Anyone who believes that U.S. nuclear posture should continue to rest on the deterrent value of a retaliatory attack must also endorse measures that will ensure that the central nervous system for such a response is adequate and survivable. Likewise, we must be confident that we will receive warning of impending attack in as timely and unambiguous a manner as possible.

Nevertheless, in improving our capacity to learn of and respond to an imminent nuclear threat, there are several tempting illusions that must be avoided. First, we must take care that neither we nor our allies and adversaries come to believe there is a high probability that nuclear war can be controlled or kept limited once the nuclear threshold has been breached. Secondly, we must be wary of the illusion—which the Defense Department's portrayal of the new strategic package fosters—that somehow a robust command and control system could be developed that “would endure for an extended period beyond the first nuclear attack.” Such an assumption can be almost entirely vitiated by a determined attacker and only “best-case” planning would presume a less than determined attacker. Lastly, we must guard against the possibility that upgrading our command, control, and communications systems will in time make it possible to adopt a policy of “launch on warning” or “launch under attack.”

As attractive as such a posture might seem for avoiding any possible loss of our deterrent forces, it is fraught with peril in a crisis. Neither the judgment of men nor the sophistication of electronic equipment are any proof against mistakes with incalculable consequences. Moreover, our nuclear forces have been designed for over two decades with the goal in mind of being able to ride out an initial attack while still retaining the capacity to retaliate with an unacceptably high level of destruction. That is, we have developed forces and maintained alert rates that assume a significant portion of our land-based or in-port forces will be lost if an adversary strikes first. This gives us freedom from the pressure to shoot first in a crisis. We should not depreciate this freedom in an excess of fear about the survivability of our strategic Triad, which, on the whole, is highly survivable and certainly more so than the equivalent Soviet force.

If the foregoing caveats are heeded, the Administration's command and control improvements will on balance contribute to our ability to detect and deter a nuclear attack.

As to strategic defenses, there is much in the Administration's program that seems prudent, though such defensive measures cannot do more than marginally influence the outcome of a nuclear exchange. I am confident, moreover, that this Administration will learn, as all of its predecessors have learned, that there is no such thing as a “cost effective civil defense program” or even an effective civil defense program. There is also little reason to believe that a truly effective anti-ballistic missile system lies in the future, given the constant improvement and increase of offensive nuclear weapons. Research and development should be pursued nevertheless as a means of keeping abreast of this technology.

Included in the defensive package, however, is the pursuit of an operational anti-satellite system and of a space-based anti-ballistic missile system. While the United States may have the edge in these emerging technologies today, there can be no doubt, based on the record, that our adversary will take compensating action to acquire similar capabilities of its own, should our system prove effective. Over the long term, the result will be the militarization of outer space and the multiplication, not reduction, of threats to American security. It is likely that space platforms for many benign purposes—such as the monitoring of arms control agreements—are much more important to the United States than they are to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we have a greater incentive to prevent the militarization of space and the consequent threat to our assets in space.

In a matter of months, we will witness the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, which attempted to forestall just this exploitation of space for military purposes. The Treaty has served us well but it will be coming under pressure from advancing technology. The safer and wiser course for the United States is not to yield unthinkingly to these technological pressures. Rather, our course should be to close the loopholes in this Treaty that are being opened by emerging technologies.

Over the years, the kind of arms control that has been most successful and most helpful has been preclusive arms control, that is, measures which close off certain technological avenues or geographical areas to superpower competition. The Antarctic and Seabed Treaties are other examples of this approach to greater security from the threat of nuclear war. We should not lose the opportunities that we still have to build on these successes and avoid a military space race that can have no other end than to decrease our security and that of our allies.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION

The strategic weapons program announced last month focuses primarily on delivery systems and related facilities. Yet it implies a potentially very large increase in our inventory of nuclear weapons, that is, the explosive charges carried by these delivery vehicles. Indeed, there has been a high-level suggestion that we should obtain fissile material for new nuclear weapons from the used or "spent" fuel from civilian nuclear power reactors. If implemented, this plan would have consequences of the gravest kind for American security, energy, and nuclear non-proliferation policies. It is not going too far to say that this plan would lead to the virtual militarization of the American nuclear power industry.

Briefly, such a program for expanding our arsenal of nuclear weapons would involve using a new and as yet unproven technology known as Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) to purify civilian reactor-grade plutonium for weapons use. This new technology strips away plutonium isotopes found in spent fuel so as to produce a concentrated form of nearly pure, highly fissile plutonium-239.

The requirement for additional weapons-grade plutonium arises from the Administration's plans to simultaneously build neutron or enhanced radiation weapons (ERW), to deploy new and more lethal theater nuclear weapons in West Europe, and to expand the U.S. strategic arsenal. Also in the works are plans to modernize tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. In sum, every type of American nuclear weapon will be substantially increased or improved.

While no figures are available, or likely to become available, as to the size of the overall increase in our nuclear weapons inventory, the various programs being put in train by the Administration suggest that there will be about 5,000 new theater and strategic nuclear weapons before the end of the decade and a smaller number of new tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. Whether these new nuclear weapons would be added to our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons or whether some would replace current warheads is also unknown. But to date there has been little talk of reducing our nuclear weapons inventory in any manner and we must suppose that many of these new weapons will be additive to existing totals.

It is difficult to see what contribution this expansion of nuclear bombs and warheads will make to our security. The United States already has an estimated inventory of some 24,000 nuclear weapons, of which nearly 10,000 are for intercontinental delivery systems and many more are stationed in Europe or the Far East within striking distance of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Soviets are believed to have on the order of 16,000 nuclear weapons, some half of which are deployed on systems of intercontinental range. Clearly, the motive in expanding the U.S. stockpile cannot be to catch up to the Soviet Union, since we are already ahead.

Nor can one believe that the number of vital targets in the Soviet Union has expanded so as to justify a major increase in our nuclear arsenal. And, after all, it is the target list that should determine our weapons requirements, not the size of the Soviet weapons inventory.

The only purposes which these new weapons can serve are apparently to bolster our self-confidence and to make it more feasible to fight a protracted nuclear war. The first reflects a dependence on nuclear weapons that is unworthy of us and the second is impractical and perilous, especially if it spurs a similar expansion of Soviet stockpiles. A recent report for the Department of Energy by the Rand Corporation suggests that the Soviet Union has stockpiled large quantities of uranium and plutonium which could support such an expansion.¹

The proposed increase in U.S. nuclear weapons will also seriously impair efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement and to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons. The Administration's strategic and other nuclear weapons programs involve new types of weapons that will require extensive underground testing. The day when we can make good on our pledge to achieve a total ban on such test will be put back many years.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of which the United States was the principal sponsor, has already expressed its concern about the use of reactor spent fuel for bombmaking.² IAEA officials believe such a United States

¹ Gloria Duffy, *Soviet Nuclear Energy: Domestic and International Policies*, Rand Report R-2362-DOE of December 1979. See also Gloria Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports," *International Security*, Summer 1978.

² David Fishlock, "Pentagon 'Plutonium for Arms' Scheme Attacked," *Financial Times*, London, September 24, 1981.

move will damage the credibility of the Agency, which has bolstered its non-proliferation efforts by pointing out that no nuclear weapon state has obtained nuclear explosives from a civil power reactor. IAEA is also rightly concerned that extracting weapons grade plutonium from spent reactor fuel will raise new alarms about civilian nuclear power. These are concerns which we should share, in particular since the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime is under great pressure and needs U.S. help, not our bad example.

Economic, strategic, and technological realities have combined to produce an Administration program that is less than its earlier description of the "window of vulnerability" would have suggested. Yet it is a program that lacks a coherent rationale or demonstrates a clear sense of strategic purpose. Instead, it seem to have no other objective than to match the Soviets, particularly in the acquisition of hard-target kill capacity. This is the more odd, since the United States is the leader in so many of the crucial dimensions of nuclear forces, such as numbers of weapons, missile accuracy, force alert rates, survivable sea-based forces, and weapon system reliability.

By adopting a reactive posture rather than a clear-cut deterrent strategy, the Administration is accelerating the trend toward acquiring a presumptive first-strike force. And the drift toward a nuclear war-fighting doctrine is reconfirmed. Instead of applying our ingenuity to managing the uncertainties and risks of the thermonuclear age, we seem to be proliferating magnets which draw us ever closer to disaster.

For some, the addition of thousands of nuclear weapons under the Reagan program may suggest a challenge to Soviet armaments and thus greater security for the United States. But it ensures no reduction in Soviet forces and may stimulate their increase. If there is any way to reduce the threat from the Soviet Union, it must be through reducing their nuclear arsenal and, for this, we have no recourse other than negotiated arms limitation.

IMPROVING OUR SECURITY

The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that, while the Administration's strategic program poses no immediate threat to its stated goal of achieving significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, it does contain significant hazards in the medium and long term, both for the prospects of arms reduction and for our nation's security. If matched by an equivalent building program on the Soviet side, as we must assume it will be, then the strategic environment of the mid-to late-1980s will be marked by greater threats and an overall decrease in our security at a far higher cost.

There is another lesson which can be drawn from this review. It is that, with only a few exceptions, nuclear weapons technology is no longer yielding security benefits at an affordable price. Basically, we have done all of the "Easy" things. The cost of the original Triad of strategic forces was more than compensated for by the deterrent value it provided. In the future, we will be paying a higher and higher price for ever more marginal return on the investment. This is amply reflected in the cost of the MX missile system compared with that of the Minuteman system or when one compares the cost and value of the B-52 bomber with the cost and value expected for the B-1 bomber.

The way out of the dilemma of ever more costly weapon systems with ever more marginal security benefits is through arms limitation. It is the best means available for managing technology to produce greater security for all.

It has been argued, of course, that worthwhile arms limitation agreements can only be achieved if we negotiate from a position of clear superiority and that this proposed American build-up is essential to achieve this margin of superiority for negotiating purposes. First, this reinforces the myth that our forces have not been steadily modernized throughout the 1970s, when in fact they have grown enormously in numbers and capability. Secondly, there is no warrant in history or human psychology for believing this seductive proposition.

For ten years after the dawn of the nuclear age we negotiated with the Soviet Union to control the nuclear genie; during this period we negotiated from a position first of nuclear monopoly and then of overwhelming superiority. At no time in this period did we come close to achieving a meaningful agreement. Instead, all that resulted on both sides was rhetoric. And anyone who has ever negotiated a contract of any kind knows that there is little incentive on either side to come to the bargaining table if there is a wide disparity in the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties; the stronger will feel that negotiating is unnecessary and the weaker will see it as incapable of producing an equitable contract.

In addition, in pursuing its strategic and arms limitation policies, the Administration must recognize that these matters are of increasing concern to publics in this country and abroad. Nuclear policy can no longer be made by a small group within the government, unmindful of the public will. For good or ill, all aspects of nuclear policy have now become very salient to the public of the industrial democracies. Naturally, this complicates issues which were formerly reserved for the action of a few officials. Yet, as a practical political matter, what has been termed "The democratization of nuclear decision-making" cannot be ignored if governments are to develop programs which command enduring public support.

In our own country, concern over the growth of nuclear arsenals is growing, while the sentiment in favor of limitations and reductions continues to be strong. I doubt that the Administration's strategic program can succeed in the Congress or with the public unless the Administration is, and is seen to be, equally in earnest about achieving the arms control goals that it has set for itself.

I am heartened that President Reagan has stated that all of the elements of the new strategic package are open to negotiation. Patient and astute diplomacy is the best of the options available for achieving security for the remainder of the decade. If we do not pursue this option vigorously, the prospect is for greater threats, great uncertainty and opportunity for miscalculation, and greater costs. Our government can have no higher purpose under current circumstances than to prevent these perilous developments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Smith.

I would like first to indicate that any time that I ask a question that you feel could better be answered on a classified basis, that we will certainly respect that judgment on your part and accept a classified answer.

Also, we will keep the record open so that if there is any section of it that you would like to review and add to later, you certainly may do so. We will keep it open for any reasonable period of time that you would like.

First, I would like to ask a question perhaps of both Ambassador Watson and Ambassador Smith. It concerns the general perception that many people in the United States have that you just cannot trust the Soviets, so why bother making treaties with them.

There have been articles in publications like the Reader's Digest which were filled with assertions that the Soviets breach treaties right and left.

You have studied this intensively over the years. What is your perception of the reliability of a treaty once it has been agreed to by the Soviets? Take into account the known fact that they are tough bargainers, they will bargain hard, and it is an excruciatingly painful process sometimes, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out in his eloquent book on the subject.

But once we have hammered out and clearly understand what those terms are, what is the batting average that we have on our side for observing those treaties? And what can we say about Soviet adherence to those treaties, to the letter of them and, to the extent that you can comment, to the spirit of them?

Ambassador WATSON. I think I would defer to Ambassador Smith, who, as you know, has negotiated SALT I and has vastly deeper experience than I on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Smith, why don't you start off. Then we can get back to Ambassador Watson for his perception. I would ask you please to speak into the microphones. We are having a little trouble hearing you.

Ambassador SMITH. Certainly. I think, Mr. Chairman, the question of trust is not very relevant. In most cases, a bank does not trust a person to whom it lends money; it requires security.

I have always thought that the question, "Can you trust the Russians," was misplaced. I think the proper question is, "Will you know if there is a violation of the agreement? What can you do about it if there is? And can you escape from the restraints on your country pretty easily?"

We have structured these treaties so that the only type of constraint that applies would be one we could verify that it was being lived up to. We have escape clauses in all of our modern arms control treaties which permit us to free ourselves from any constraint with a very short period of notice.

So I would say that Soviet record in SALT has been certified by three Presidents, I believe, in writing as having fulfilled the commitments of SALT I. We now hope that they will live up to the provisions of SALT II. I think it would have been much better to have a treaty on SALT II, but we now have accepted a situation where we hope that the tacit constraints will continue to be honored by them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador Watson.

Ambassador WATSON. I have little to add except to suggest that your committee might want to hear other people who have negotiated for 15 years with the Soviets on the subject of compliance. We do, as Ambassador Smith said, require good verification of all of the treaties.

I particularly invite your attention to Ambassador Robert Buchheim, who chaired the standing compliance or consultative committee, which was a Soviet-United States committee, required to balance off infractions or suspected infractions on either side. I think the total looked into was six on one side and seven on the other, approximately those figures. They were all settled to the satisfaction of both sides.

So I think the process has been exceedingly successful. I have been in Geneva and watched it on three different occasions. I think it is tragic that it is in such ill repute at the present moment.

The CHAIRMAN. You have recommended in your testimony, Ambassador Watson, that the committee consult with Ambassador Robert Buchheim. I share your very high opinion of him, and this question is something that could well be put to him. The Standing Consultative Committee has dealt with these issues, verification and breaches of treaties, et cetera, for a long time.

One concern that I have had, and I wonder if either one of you can shed any light on it, is this: We do have a treaty involving biological warfare. There is a provision in that treaty that says if there is evidence of a breach, there shall be consultation and adequate investigation of it.

We did have a reported epidemic of anthrax, release of spores that appeared to be suspicious and might possibly have led people to conclude that there was a breach of that treaty and that the Soviets may be in not experimental production but production of biological weapons. And there have been charges by the Secretary of State recently that there have been usages of biological warfare in Asia.

Is this the kind of a thing, knowing the Soviets as you both do, where the provisions of the treaty should be followed that require full consultation whenever violations appear to have occurred?

We have consulted with the Soviets when they feel there has been a breach on our side. The integrity of our future treaties depends upon a mutual willingness to consult freely with each other whenever there are evidences of breach and, if there is a breach, then to explain why.

But it does break the process down somewhat if you come up against a provision in the treaty that is not now being adhered to. Do you want to comment on that incident and what its impact may be?

Ambassador WATSON. I would like to comment, if I might, on the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in the Soviet Union. This is where the Soviets become frustrating, and I don't have a good answer. We did have an indication that there was some anthrax in that general area that resulted from an accident.

In approaching Mr. Gromyko and his deputy over a period of some weeks on this subject, I had a complete denial. I felt that they first were surprised at the accusation, and yet as we went into it more deeply we found that the matter had been reported in some detail in the Sverdlovsk papers, and as a result it ended up that it was completely impossible to prove whether it happened or not.

The question was had Soviet people in that area eaten infected meat and contracted anthrax or breathed spores grown by man in order to kill people militarily. My only answer on that is in any treaty that we have in the chemical warfare area, if we cannot verify it and cannot make some visitations, and if the Soviets are unwilling to prove they didn't do it, and they often take the attitude of how could you impugn my honor, so to speak, and it is hard to argue when you are looking at them across the table, I would not continue treaties where they were not willing to be forthcoming.

Now as a caveat, I would say that I was unhappy about our evidence on Sverdlovsk, and from what I have read in the paper, I am unhappy about the depth of our evidence on this yellow rain. I would like to have a little deeper proof of what they have done and how they have misbehaved before I began to abrogate treaties but I don't know anything more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad that Senator Pell has joined us today, but he also whispered to me that he sees people straining in the back. The microphones are, regretfully, very directional, and if you could speak directly into them, the people in the back of the room would be able to hear you better.

Senator Pell, I will carry on with questions for a few more minutes and then we will have you make any opening comments that you may wish to make.

Senator PELL. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been discussing at the outset of these hearings a continuation of this subject: When do we begin face-to-face talks with the Soviets leading to negotiations? The estimate has been used from the outset that possibly by the spring of next year we could be ready. The committee was very pleased to note that Secretary Haig and Professor Rostow have indicated that we could aim as early as February for such talks leading to negotiations.

Would either of you care to expand on the comments made in your testimony about the desirability of those talks getting underway and the danger of always finding some reason to delay them even

further? Is February a realistic date? What is the danger if we just let it keep slipping to later into next year?

Ambassador SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, that some of the motivation as to timing by the administration was to get closer to a point where they had the new programs authorized. I think this is their calculation as to how one's bargaining power is increased. It is hard for me to believe that 13 months or more are needed to do the intellectual exercise of deciding on what proposals you should submit to the Soviets.

Having said that, I don't think the difference between the 10 months that it took us in 1969 to get started and the 12 or 13 months that we are talking about here is worrisome at all. The main thing is to get cracking on negotiating, avoid the appearance of being dragged to the negotiating table. I think there is some of that feeling around the world; that the United States is a reluctant dragon, and that is a very bad impression for us to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly would verify that that impression was one that I detected very strongly when I was with Ambassador Watson in Moscow in November; that is, skepticism as to whether the United States of America was serious about this. I think it not only has undercut our credibility with the other major force in the world, a superpower with whom we can negotiate on this issue and try to reach an accord, but also it really has undercut us in much of the world.

Europe certainly is very outspoken about its concerns about our reluctance to step forward and begin serious talks leading to negotiations. I have found skepticism even as to whether or not any administration has the power anymore to get a treaty ratified once it was signed by the executive branch.

They pointed out that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty of 1976, one signed by President Nixon and one signed by President Ford, and SALT II signed by President Carter, not a single one of these treaties has been ratified in those years since SALT I.

There is skepticism as to whether this administration was either willing to or wanted to move to negotiations, and then if it did, whether or not this committee would ever ratify it. Do you think it would be desirable for the committee, even though the thresholds are high, to actively pursue ratification of the two treaties that are still before us, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and get those ratified now that they have long since been signed by President Nixon and President Ford?

Ambassador WATSON. Senator, it would be great to get them ratified, but the big question is what we are going to do on the major subject of treating the big big strategic missiles. Until we decide that, other things are affirmative and will be helpful in creating the right atmosphere with the Soviets. But the big game is in the major treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. We have to make very clear that although the accomplishment would be very little, at least it would be a symbol of moving forward and a symbol that we can ratify something if the Reagan administration asks the Senate to do so, I have every confidence that if it asked us to do that, we would ratify those treaties and advise and consent on them for ratification, just as I have always been confident that if we can negotiate with this

administration a SALT II or II½ or III, that the Senate of the United States will ratify it.

Would you want to comment on the question, Ambassador Smith?

Ambassador SMITH. I would like to comment especially on the point you made about the inability of the United States apparently to ratify treaties. I have gone on public record as favoring the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Uses Testing Treaty; however, I do agree with Ambassador Watson that it would not be of great significance but would be a small forward step.

But I think this question of whether the United States is able to act through the treaty route is of central importance. I would urge you, with a sense of temerity, perhaps, to consider the alternate route which the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides for arms control agreements to be approved by a majority vote of both Houses of the Congress.

You will recall that that was the route chosen in 1972 for SALT I, that is, the offensive part, the freeze. That was not submitted as a treaty, and there was no objection at the time, as I remember. I would like to see the Senate pull back a little bit from its historical position in the name of getting on with this and acquiesce if the administration so chooses in setting up obstacles that are not quite as high as the two-thirds majority required.

The CHAIRMAN. My last question in this first round pertains to whether a summit meeting is desirable and the significance you both would attach to it. When I asked Secretary Haig about the possibility of aiming toward a summit meeting between President Reagan and Secretary General Brezhnev in the year 1982, he indicated that that would be a desirable goal.

Both of you have engaged in intensive negotiations through the years with the Soviets and both of you know Mr. Brezhnev. Would you comment on the advantages you would see in having a face-to-face discussion between the leaders of the two major powers on Earth today and what could come from it, taking into account the success the President has had at Ottawa, Cancun and the 70-some visits he has had with world leaders, including those of our allies and the developing nations.

All have been highly successful in better understanding the nature of the problem and seeing a correlation between some of the interests that we have and finding some kind of common ground. Can we do so with an avowed adversary with success?

Ambassador WATSON. I think such a meeting would be entirely good and useful if the administration has decided that it really wants to negotiate and pass a SALT II-type treaty. I think to meet in order to reduce tensions without any real goal in sight other than to exchange views and visit would not be useful, Senator Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador SMITH. I don't agree with that, Mr. Chairman. I have been against summit meetings for anything except cosmetic purposes for about 30 years. I don't think arms control should be negotiated in the context of the hoopla involved in a summit meeting. I think at this time where we have been growling at each other for quite a while now, it might be useful psychologically to have President Reagan meet

with Brezhnev, but there is the danger of raising expectations with which one would have to contend.

So I think I just as soon would see a serious effort made at a lower level, and once there was progress being made on that, then perhaps I would have a summit meeting. But I wouldn't object to it at all if its limited purpose was clearly understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it wouldn't be presumed that the negotiating of a detailed treaty would be undertaken at such a meeting, but I should think the goal would be the creation of that climate and an attempt better to understand each other at the decisionmaking level when various decisions being made can create the climate.

We saw an incident in Afghanistan totally derail SALT II by agreement of both parties in the Senate and the President. It created a climate that was not conducive for discussion of arms control agreements. To prevent such activities in the future has a direct relationship to the climate in which we would be taking up such a treaty.

I thank you very much.

Senator Pell, are there any opening comments you would like to make?

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am particularly pleased to be here this morning with two witnesses whom I admire so much and whom I have known for so many years. I think each brings a unique perspective here.

Ambassador Watson with his years as chairman of the General Advisory Committee on arms control and disarmament and as Ambassador to the Soviet Union has had a unique juxtaposition of experiences there. Ambassador Smith, who has labored long and hard to achieve some of the most important treaties that we have, is here too.

I really express my respect for both gentlemen. Incidentally, I was delighted to put into the Congressional Record the speeches that Ambassador Watson gave at Harvard and Brown Universities. I thought they were excellent. I only wish more of my colleagues had read them.

I have several questions. First as a general nature, I am just curious as to your reaction. It often has been said that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted, that they violate their treaties and agreements. I wonder if you could recall for our information any treaty or written agreement a specific provision of which they have violated. That is addressed to either of you.

Ambassador Watson?

Ambassador WATSON. I know of none.

Senator PELL. Do you, Ambassador Smith?

Ambassador SMITH. Senator Pell, it is generally expected that their honoring of the Yalta Agreements was less than 100 percent. As Senator Percy just mentioned, the biological convention case, it seems to me a serious charge has been raised that they are not living up to that.

I think the record shows that they have lived up to their bilateral treaties with the United States. That is the important thing in talking about strategic arms control. Three Presidents have found in writing that they have lived up to them.

Senator PELL. I don't defend the rape of Eastern Europe nor does anybody, but I think words also are important here and their interpretation. Free democratic elections mean one thing on one side of the Iron Curtain and another thing on the other side. I only wish they had the same meaning on both sides.

I think we should bear in mind that specific provisions of treaties have so far not been violated by them. I think this canard probably could be put to rest, although they obviously go very close to the line and would do anything they could to score us down.

In connection with the question of MIRVing, I remember some years back urging Secretary Kissinger not to move ahead with it because his view at the time was that it was an advantage that we had: we had the ability to do it, the Soviets didn't, and we should do it. I remember we had quite a discussion in the Foreign Relations Committee, I think it was a closed session, on this subject.

Well as you know, the Russians did follow us, and because they have heavier missiles, they have more fractionation than we do, which means that they can put many large warheads on their missiles. I think you were deeply involved in this MIRVing issue, Ambassador Smith, and maybe you could illuminate history for us. What happened? Did we propose, as Secretary Haig said, in good faith a no-MIRVing treaty? Will you fill us in a little bit?

Ambassador SMITH. As I recall, Senator Pell, there was a great deal of controversy in 1969 and 1970 about whether we should propose a MIRV ban. As I remember, Senator Brooke had a resolution that a large number of Members of Congress supported urging a MIRV ban. When we were putting together proposals, I argued strongly with President Nixon that a MIRV ban should be included and argued that if it were not included, we would be crying in 5 or 10 years that our ICBM's were unduly vulnerable.

The President authorized us to put a proposal to the Soviets that had a number of unattractive features to it from the Soviet point of view. As I remember, it called for onsite inspections. Historically the Soviets have been quite unenthusiastic about onsite inspections.

It also would have prevented the Soviets from testing MIRV's while we had fully tested our program, and it would not have permitted deployment but it would have permitted us to produce MIRV's, as I remember it, as long as we didn't deploy them.

I was not surprised when the Soviets showed no interest in that sort of freezing them into an inferior position from which we could break loose very quickly, having tested and perhaps produced MIRV's. So we tried to get the administration to make a more reasonable MIRV proposal. I confess in retrospect I don't think I tried hard enough. It seemed that it was clear to me the administration was not in favor of a MIRV ban. They were trying to respond to pressures on the Hill to get ahead with it.

The Joint Chiefs were very much against it. They felt this was an effort to try to block technology and that it is somehow wrong to try to do that. After about 6 months, the MIRV question was laid to rest, I thought with a sort of mutual satisfaction on both the Soviet and American sides, that they were not going to have to push ahead with that.

So if the charge is that we didn't really make a whole-hearted effort, I think this is correct. On the other hand, I think the President must have made a calculation that he couldn't get through the Congress both a MIRV ban and an ABM limitation, if not an ABM ban as the General Advisory Committee had proposed. I think he just didn't have the stomach to try to take on the two at the same time.

Senator PELL. In retrospect, how important do you believe achievement of a ban on MIRVs might have been?

Ambassador SMITH. If it had been effective, it certainly would have made the present strategic balance look a lot more stable because the whole Minuteman vulnerability question would be of a different order of magnitude.

Senator PELL. Looking ahead into the future, do you see a new SALT agreement, maybe not SALT II or III but a SALT XII or SALT XV where one of the ways of getting the genie back into the bottle might be to go back to a single warhead on a missile?

Ambassador SMITH. That would be very hard to verify short of getting a screwdriver out and taking off the warhead to see whether it had a single or multiple vehicle. The only way we could figure in SALT I was to stop the testing process which is visible. Once we had gotten down to the bottom of our testing program, it was very difficult to see any way to have a complete ban on which you could rely.

I urged the administration to have a moratorium on testing so that we wouldn't get through that sound barrier where you couldn't have a control anymore, but this was anathema to the Nixon administration.

Ambassador WATSON. Senator Pell, may I add a comment?

Senator PELL. Please, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador WATSON. I think the whole question of the pace of technology and the way we develop military equipment is one of the dangers that has brought us into the present situation. I don't really know how to stop it. But most decisions on which I look back are decisions that have been made on every branch of government to get a 2- or 3-year leg up on the Soviet Union, and 5 years later we wish we hadn't made those decisions.

I submit that if there were a way the Senate could suggest that we would look ahead 10 to 40 years rather than 2 to 3 years, it would be very difficult to control military and other people who like to make inventions and move ahead. But as far as I am concerned, once you have produced something in the laboratory, it is terribly hard not to get enough people behind it so that it gets deployed. You can see that in the parts of the program that we are coming to.

There is one other thing that I would like to correct. When I said I did not know of the Soviets breaking a treaty, I meant bilateral arms control treaties. I certainly did not mean the germ warfare treaties because there is a big question there. I just wanted to correct any misunderstanding that I might have created.

Senator PELL. At Brown University you brought up the idea of a commission on national security policy. I wonder if you would care to elaborate a little bit on that here. Also, would that not tend to replace in a way the functions of the Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, and also, frankly, replace the U.S. Senate a little bit?

Ambassadore WATSON. Some Senators with whom I have chatted about think that that is my intent. I assure you it is not. I have been disturbed by the fact that when one administration is voted out and another administration comes in, everything sort of has to go back to zero in the arms control/international relations field.

For 240 million people in this country who have different political persuasions, I don't think it is really fair to them to not have a continuity of our dangerous relationships around the world. When I look at the SALT Treaty, we have all of our alliance for the SALT process and the SALT II Treaty. We have the Joint Chiefs of Staff for it. And yet right now it is stalled. I really don't know why.

The suggestion I made at Brown University was a patched up idea to try to carry a continuity from one administration to the next so that the processes would not be stopped for 10 to 15 months. Now, you know the nature of those weapons probably better than I do, but the development and deployment of these weapons are not susceptible to having the control of them stop every 4 years for 10 or 15 months. We are just going to do ourselves in if we continue along that line.

I am sure there will be many arguments against my idea. I have a kind of hope that out of the discussion will come a useful idea.

Senator PELL. My time has expired, but I would be interested in one further reaction from each of you gentlemen. I have a deep sense of gloom as I look ahead feeling that we really are on a collision course with the Soviet Union and that people have pushed the concepts, the reality of a nuclear war under the carpet, and at the same time there is an increasing acceptance of the idea that we could have a limited nuclear war, about which the administration has been talking a great deal. Also, under a prolonged nuclear war, I have heard that there would be two opposing generals floating around in command airplanes directing the scorching of the planet Earth.

I find myself devoting a lot of thought to this and am very depressed about the future. Do you share this gloom or are you more optimistic, Ambassador Watson?

Ambassador WATSON. No, Senator Pell. I think the outlook is extremely bleak. I think it presents the Senate and the administration, the President of the United States with great opportunities. But the task of bringing all of these various forces together in the United States to recognize the peril and to control it sensibly is terribly difficult.

In the Soviet Union the Politburo is about all that has to make a decision. There are some political pressures but they are limited. Over here we have a marvelous process that has built the best country in the world, but that process is not really organized to make decisions and make them consistently in the same way that the Soviet Union is.

Now, I am not suggesting that theirs is a fine government and is in any way equal to our government. I am just talking about their ability to make decisions and have them have a continuity to them. That is where I think we are in great trouble in treating this difficult weapon.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Ambassador Smith, do you share my deep gloom or do you see any cause for optimism?

Ambassador SMITH. No, Senator, I think we are in for a dark night of arms control for some time.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Ambassador Watson you were the chairman of the General Advisory Committee on arms control and disarmament. There has not been a designation by this administration for a new chairman. We have not had a formal name submitted to us, though several have been discussed.

Would you describe the importance that you attach to such a committee, the type of personnel, the people that you would like to see assigned to it, what kind of balance is desirable and necessary, taking into account the present structure and organization on arms control that is in place in the administration? Then could you relate that also to your concept discussed this morning and advocated originally at Brown University for the establishment of a commission on national security policy to advise the President?

How would that relate to the General Advisory Committee on arms control and disarmament that does now exist?

Ambassador WATSON. Well I don't think it is appropriate for me to comment on how the GAC ought to be chosen. I think the result of the process produced for me a very workable committee, and for the 2 years that I worked with them, I think we, or perhaps they, made a difference in questioning certain arms decisions, and President Carter was very forthcoming in listening to what we had to say, as was Secretary Vance. So that I thought it was a useful device.

Like so many devices in government, even though they are permanently on your books, when the administration changes there tends to be a dropping of those devices or committees and then picking them up again later on. I think somehow you have to find some way of having continuity.

We had a bipartisan commission on that GAC or bipartisan makeup, and I don't see why you need change it or drop it, this committee or other committees, when the administration changes.

Now, other people have suggested that to keep the continuity of the type we are talking about between administrations and on arms control that a beefed up GAC would work just as well as my suggestion on the commission or an advisory body. I don't care, really, which it is. It would be very, very difficult to structure.

I am just terribly unhappy with what is happening at the moment. I agree with Ambassador Smith's characterization that we are in for a long, bleak night in the arms control field. I know of no way of reducing tensions in the world other than through arms control.

I see us weakening our alliance with our western European allies simply because we are stalled on arms control. I believe those alliances are pretty important to us. I recognize that we can fight stand-off wars sort of over the top of those allies, but the political implications of losing the western alliance I think are grave.

So I think that something to keep the process going constantly through changes of administration, through political campaigns and so forth is terribly important.

The CHAIRMAN. David Stockman in his much celebrated recent article in the Atlantic Monthly did talk about his concerns about the buildup in arms and the impact that cost would have on our economy. I do not think it is possible to have a credible foreign policy without a strong national defense, but I also don't think you can have a strong national defense without a strong economy.

The perception of our continuing to mount deficits upon deficits and use a large part of that money to buy still more weaponry could have a devastating effect on our economy and on perceptions around the world where we are trying to encourage nations not just to arm but to do a lot more for their people.

Is there a relationship there between what we do in building up and building up and our ability to get other countries not to spend as much on military hardware? We have more and more requests of this committee for the most sophisticated weaponry being introduced into countries who can ill afford to buy them, and we are being asked to finance part of that.

Ambassador WATSON. I think there is a very definite relationship. I myself think our total program relies much too heavily on nuclear weapons and we have not really demonstrated a national will to the world by building conventional weapons and getting ourselves organized to man them. I don't hear the word "draft" mentioned, at least not hardly at all, and yet that certainly would demonstrate to the Soviets that we meant business much more than building more weapons. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You are absolutely right that the subject of military service must be raised, must be brought up and must be discussed as a part of this whole procedure. We had a beginning, at least, with the draft registration, but we have not talked much about it since. I think the subject need not be an unthinkable subject, however politically difficult it is to even mention it. But I think the subject must be raised and I am pleased that you raise it in your testimony.

Ambassador Smith, as adviser to President Carter on nonproliferation matters, what effect do you think the proposed strategic building will have on U.S. nonproliferation efforts? If we continue to build on both sides more strategic weapons and we arm and arm and arm, what impact is it going to have on our efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world?

Ambassador SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly it will have a bad effect on our hopes for stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 had a basic bargain built into it that if countries that did not have nuclear weapons would agree to forswear those, the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to get on with controlling their arms, reducing them and disarming, and except for the ABM Treaty, we and the Soviets, to my mind, have not lived up to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

So as we go ahead and the Soviets go ahead building up their nuclear forces, it makes it more attractive for countries around the world to say, well, we probably should have this sort of weaponry ourselves. We should be going in the opposite direction of making nuclear weapons seem less attractive, less prestigious, and avoid such complete dependence on them, as Ambassador Watson was talking about.

May I make one footnote to his suggestion about the need for continuity? I agree with that. I think the General Advisory Committee if properly constituted could meet his requirement. The committee was established, as I remember it, by an act of Congress, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

I don't see why the Congress couldn't put in a provision for fixed terms for the members of that committee that would not be coterminous with the end of administrations. We might have something like the Federal Reserve Board with a chairman who had a long term. That would give the necessary continuity.

In addition to that, it was my experience, and I served on that committee for some years, that too much attention was paid to the sort of public relations aspect of the composition. Without wanting to reflect on any specific members, a number of them had no background in the atomic energy or nuclear weaponry field.

They were excellent human beings and I gather they were put on to be persuasive in their communities of the need for arms control, but so much of the time of that committee was spent on educating people which could have been spent on trying to stretch their minds in new directions for arms control.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Watson, would you concur that fixed terms for members of the Commission would be desirable?

Ambassador WATSON. I think that would be a great step in the right direction, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, why don't you and I consider studying this matter and see if we cannot provide the kind of continuity with some joint amendment that would put fixed terms in? I think the continuity of many of our commissions is ensured by having fixed terms, and it bridges the administration.

I think that is a good suggestion and I appreciate it very much, Ambassador Smith. I certainly will follow through on it.

Let me go back again to your comments on nonproliferation, Ambassador Smith. In light of what you have said, would you not feel that the weapons program of the administration must be linked to a truly dedicated effort on SALT in order not to have the fallout effects that you have described on many other countries?

Ambassador SMITH. Certainly, the more seriously we take SALT the better it is for nonproliferation, and not just SALT, Senator Percy. For instance, a comprehensive test ban, I think, is an essential plank in a nonproliferation program. We seem to have just forgotten about the comprehensive test ban. I think that negotiations are in limbo.

The CHAIRMAN. I had some additional questions, but I would like to take into account your own personal schedules. If we carry on for another 20 or 25 minutes or so, would that fit in with your own personal plans?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes.

Ambassador WATSON. That would be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. I can always submit questions to you for the record if you have to depart before then.

I would like to go back to the testimony Secretary Haig gave before this committee last week when he reiterated that it was the President's policy that the United States would continue to respect the restraints

of the unratified SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union demonstrated the same restraint. Then Secretary Weinberger followed him, testifying that the Soviets have remained within the limits of SALT II since the treaty was signed in 1979, corroborating your own general impressions.

In your judgment, how important is it that the United States continue this policy? I would ask either one of you to respond as you see fit.

Ambassador WATSON. I missed the subject, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The question simply is how important it is that the United States continue the policy of the Reagan administration, as enunciated by Secretary Haig, that the United States will continue to respect the constraints of the unratified SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union demonstrates that same restraint?

Ambassador WATSON. I am glad you asked that question, because I have a strong opinion on it. I think it is the least desirable of the things—excuse me—the least bad of the things that we might be doing. But I think the Senate ought to recognize that there is a chance of misperceptions on either side which would cause an instant breakout and ruin any possibility of ever getting back to any part of SALT II.

So for this nation, with its power and its abilities to be rattling along on a kind of exchange of verbal decisions to me just does not really make sense. In fact, it defies imagination as to how all of us can allow it to continue. If it is good enough to comply with, it ought to be good enough to work on, and if it is good enough to work on, it should have been worked on for a number of months.

The CHAIRMAN. It is like any two parties having an understanding or an agreement which could be breached by either one of them anytime it suits their convenience to do so. And it is a very perilous sort of a situation when you do it in this area.

Taking into account that President Reagan has said there is much in SALT II with which he agrees, though he finds it seriously flawed in some respects, is it reasonable to assume that if there is much there that they agree with, and considering that the Soviets have already said that they agree with all of it, that we at least take those parts with which there is concurrence on on both sides, and use that as the basis for moving into negotiations on an extension that would resolve all of those areas where there is dispute?

There is a framework there that one can begin with to provide a degree of continuity. You do not throw away everything of the past to start all over again.

Do you believe we have a solid basis on which to begin those discussions, particularly considering President Reagan has said there is much in SALT II with which he does agree, and we are observing it and have no present intention to cease our observance?

Ambassador SMITH. I think the course that you foreshadow is the one that we should be following, to try to take the part of the SALT that is agreed ground and to build on that. As I understand it, the tendency of the administration, if I read some of their spokesmen correctly, is to insist on large reductions right at the start.

Now, SALT II called for some reductions, especially in Soviet force levels. But I think the chances are good that if we go in and say to the Soviets, "The first thing you want to negotiate is a reduction in your heavy missiles, and we may reduce some B-52's in exchange," or something like that, well, I do not think we will get very far.

The Soviet thesis is, or has been, that one must first curb—that is the word they use, "curb"—the arms competition and then get into reductions. They resisted, although they agreed in SALT II, to some reductions. They have resisted any deep reductions.

Senator, as we get into SALT, I would hope that some special machinery would be set up to make sure that the Senate is being brought along each step so that we do not come into this situation where the administration is not able to persuade the blocking third that this is in the security interests of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you concur with that, Ambassador Watson, that it would be desirable for the Senate to be brought into the process in some way so that it is not just a fait accompli when it is sent to us and we do have input as we go along?

Ambassador WATSON. Well, I should say so. I think you may have to assign that responsibility to somebody. As a matter of fact, just as a newcomer to government when I visited in Geneva, I thought the Senate had that responsibility, because there were visiting Senators from time to time. I had no idea that when it got to the floor, there having been no major objections raised to that point, I had no idea that it would have the resistance that it had.

But by all means, it should be brought along.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, I appreciate that suggestion, and we will direct the staff to see that we do contact the administration and indicate in a formal way to them the desire of this committee—and I think I would speak for the committee in this regard without any hesitancy—in saying that that would be highly desirable so that we do not go through once again the procedure of putting together an agreement or treaty that simply will not fly here.

An input, right at the outset, I think would be desirable and would be, in the end, a saving of time. It might take a little more time as the process goes on, but I think we recognize the responsibility that the Senate has with treaties, and I think this administration fully appreciates that. So that we will work to have close cooperation with them.

Do you feel that it would be desirable, in view of the fact that the Soviets have indicated an intention to observe SALT II and the administration has said that it would, that it would help at all, particularly with respect to the Soviets keeping that restraint and staying within the confines of SALT II, for the Senate to take any kind of formal action to in any way endorse the administration's declared policy?

Could that be done with a sense of the Senate resolution stating that we should continue this policy announced by the Reagan administration, with the understanding that it would be done so long as the Soviets were to observe the same restraints?

Ambassador SMITH. Senator Percy, I think if one could obtain such a sense of the Senate resolution, without an opening up of the wounds of the SALT II debate, it would be sensible. But if it meant going over

agonizingly the heavies, the Backfires, and all those other ghosts, it could very well be counterproductive.

On that score, I would point out that you remember one of the great obstacles to getting SALT II ratified was the fact that we had no right to build heavy missiles. Now, here we are a long time after that going into a new strategic program, and guess what it contains? No heavy missiles. I think that is quite an irony of history.

The CHAIRMAN. It is. We have never had the Joint Chiefs, the Department of Defense or any Secretary of Defense advocate that we put our resources into heavy missiles. And yet here we were hung up on something that we had no intention of doing, and it was looked up on as a fault in the treaty.

Again, that is the third suggestion out of these hearings on which we will follow through, to see if we can do it in a nonprovocative way, to see if we cannot in the interests of binding this thing a little and, short of a ratification of a treaty, see if we cannot make more formal the assertions that have been made by the administration, and simply advise and consent to the extent that we reaffirm what I would hope would be at least a majority of the Senate's intention that that should be adhered to as the policy.

Are the Soviets, in your judgment, likely to be receptive to proposals for more far-ranging cooperative verification measures? The question of verification was an item that was debated at great length during the SALT II hearings. Do you think the Soviets would be receptive to proposals for probing at this time into ways by which we can have greater cooperation on verification measures?

Ambassador WATSON. I think that they would do that very slowly, Senator. I think that they are so paranoid about their borders and about secrecy within their country that they would do what you have suggested. But if you expect to get very free access to inspections of things that go on in the Soviet Union that surprise us and worry us and get it quickly and fairly, I would say that would be a matter of decades rather than years.

Ambassador SMITH. I think we ought first have a much more clear idea than I think we have as to what type of additional cooperative arrangements we have in mind. We have been thinking about this for 20 years, but very little work has been done on the specifics.

In SALT I we proposed to the Soviets some arrangements where we could ask questions. They did not have to answer them, but we would have regular machinery. Well, we got something like that in the Standing Consultative Commission.

I think the Soviets were concerned that a record would be built if we asked them, say, 15 questions over 2 years and they said, no, they could not respond. That would create a sour atmosphere, a sort of *prima facie* case that they were not honoring the treaty.

Unless we are going to get into much more qualitative limitations than SALT II, it seems to me that the present national technical means of verification are adequate to verify it without more. And I would not know what more we would want.

For instance, if we had an opportunity to have 500 human beings in the Soviet Union at all times at the expense of giving up our national technical means, I would say that is a very bad bargain. We can do much better under present conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Verification was the key, of course, to the ABM Treaty. Without adequate verification, that would not have been possible, and the assurance that we had that you could not, either one of us, build an ABM system without detection. It was very helpful.

There have been some thoughts orbited that we might go back in and resurrect the ABM. Once having fought a fight as hard and as long as we did on that one and exhausted that subject, I felt we conclusively and overwhelmingly proved that that would be the most provocative thing either side could do so far as an arms race is concerned, because you can always overwhelm an ABM system with yet another offensive weapon which is always cheaper to build than a defensive weapon.

Do you think that in retrospect the ABM Treaty serves the national security interests of the United States as it now stands?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes; I am convinced of that. I think any effort to amend or abrogate it would be, as I said in my testimony, a very pernicious development.

Ambassador WATSON. I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. And I concur with you.

As experts on the Soviet Union, do you perceive that the Soviets themselves see the ABM Treaty as being in their national interests?

Ambassador SMITH. I have seen no evidence to the contrary. They have lived up to the ABM Treaty. They had 60-some missiles deployed around Moscow in 1970, and they have the same number now. It is a completely ineffective system.

Ambassador WATSON. I agree with that, too.

The CHAIRMAN. How would the Soviets likely respond if the United States were to propose sometime in the next few years that the treaty be amended to permit a comprehensive defense of the U.S. ICBM fields? How would they look upon this proposal by us, if it were ever to be made?

Ambassador WATSON. I think the Soviets would be completely against such a thing and would be disillusioned by the proposal. We have gone over the ground and decided it was not feasible. It would also lead the United States into a complete maze of where to stop it. Do you stop it with ABM missile fields, or do you extend it to the capital of the United States or to major cities? It is a Pandora's box, so far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a few additional questions. Let me say that I concur completely with you. I think it would be a disaster and would occur over the dead bodies of a lot of us on this committee. I can assure you that we have gone through that battle before, along with John Sherman Cooper and a few others. In fact, I think that that was one of the great contributions that Senator Cooper made to the Senate of the United States. Now, I am sure he would evidence the same concern that I would about resurrecting that one.

Ambassador Watson, the President has stated that the strategic weapons now posed for deployment are the "keystone," as he has called them, to genuine arms limitations. Do you believe the Soviets' incentive to negotiate deep cuts in their strategic weaponry will be enhanced by the prospect of these new American systems coming on line?

Ambassador WATSON. Not in the slightest. I take it what you imply is that because we are going to get substantially stronger, the

Soviets in some way will want to negotiate in order to protect themselves or be concerned that they will be pulled into an arms race.

I am not really a Soviet expert, and I would not like to be thought to be one here. But my experience with them is that they will do measure for measure on any kind of arms buildup with us, and if we think we can build them into the ground in any way economically by deploying and manufacturing a lot of weapons, I think that is a wrong perception.

They certainly are a hungry people. They do not have much comforts, but they can make an awful lot more sacrifices than what they are making right now. So to think we can beat them into the ground in any kind of competition economically I think is the wrong perception.

The CHAIRMAN. You did raise a question in your testimony, Ambassador Watson, though I am not sure where it was, on the B-1. You touched very briefly on it. As a former bomber pilot flying planes in lend-lease to the Soviet Union some years back, I would be interested in your own perception of that leg of the Triad.

The B-52 is an aging fleet now. The B-1 is somewhat a different craft than it was some 3 or 4 years ago. It is proclaimed by the Department of Defense to be a more cost-effective instrument and much more sophisticated, and there are serious questions as to how long it will take the Stealth to come on line.

The first experimental model, the earliest that it could fly would be 3 years from now, and with your industrial experience you know how long it then takes to get something from a production model actually put into production. So we are talking maybe a decade before Stealth will actually come into being.

How important is it that we maintain a bomber fleet and bomber capability, in your judgment?

Ambassador WATSON. My knowledge of the Air Force deployments and what is necessary is about 30 years old now. I have no recent knowledge.

I have this question. If you have a group of weapons, most of which are 30-minute weapons from the launch point to the target, I wonder what the bomber is going to bomb?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. [General laughter.]

Am I supposed to answer that question? [General laughter.]

Ambassador WATSON. No, sir. That is hypothetical, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one further question. It is a contemporary one that came up last night. The temptation is always here to categorically lay down a hard line against the Soviet Union and any action it may take. We had an amendment to vote on that provided that should the Soviets use force in Poland and actually send in military forces on any provocation, we automatically in statute would be required unilaterally to embargo anything and everything that we send to the Soviet Union, whether it is agriculture, technology, equipment, or whatever it may be.

Secretary Haig strongly urged that the Senate not do that, that it would remove a degree of flexibility. It could be provocative, and again it would look as though we were taking unilateral action without our allies. We have recognized that embargos thrown on without the support of our allies are really ineffective fairly quickly if they do not go along with them.

We did have a substitute amendment, which I sponsored with Senator Heinz, which said that if there were an invasion we would work with our allies in developing a penalty which could take the form of an embargo, but we would not do it on a unilateral basis. And it was not a requirement on the President as one that bound his hands, it was just a sense of the Senate that this might be one of the alternatives that could be followed.

How would you gentlemen have voted on that first proposal that we had, knowing the Soviets as well as you know them? We still want to send a message, but we do not want to send a confusing message.

Ambassador SMITH. I would come out the same way that Al Haig came out on that one. And generally, I think that the present fashion of congressional contingency planning is not the way our foreign policy should be handled. I think that legislation such as the proposed legislation about the Pakistan program, if they fire a test device, we should cut off the military aid program.

In purpose, it is quite all right, but it just seems to me that you can never tell what the circumstances are going to be, and you then tie the hands of the executive branch.

For instance, we had, I forget whether it was the Glenn or the Symington amendment to the foreign aid program which required a cutoff of aid to Pakistan if they went for fissionable materials production. We cut off aid, and it had no effect at all. They kept merrily on with their two plants over there, and now we are in the process of trying to walk the cat back. And it just was an unnecessary, confusing development.

So that I would urge you to think six times before getting sort of a universal fixed legislative solution to a foreign policy problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador WATSON. I agree with that. And without presuming to make an observation which would advise the Senate of the United States, I would say that what you have not said you can say any time. I just do not believe in targeting your ideas in advance.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. We overwhelmingly agreed with you last night.

I want to thank you both very much. In all of the hearings that I have conducted through the years in the Senate, I have never committed this committee to follow up on three or four different things which have come from witnesses. But I think the suggestions that you have given us are fundamentally sound, and I think I know the thoughts of my own colleagues well enough to be able to say that we will form a consensus behind these ideas rather quickly.

I think this has been an extraordinarily helpful hearing. I will strongly recommend to all of our committee members that they read this testimony in full. As I have said, we will keep the record open for a reasonable period of time, if there is anything that you would like to add to the record or a judgment that you would like to render that could subsequently be furnished to fill out the record.

There being no further business, the meeting is adjourned. And we thank you both again very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. MAXWELL STANLEY, MUSCATINE, IOWA

I am a professional engineer and chairman of the board of directors of Stanley Consultants, Inc., international consultants in engineering, architecture, planning, and management. I am a founder and now chairman of the board of directors of Hon Industries Inc., a leading manufacturer of metal furniture and materials handling equipment. I reside in Muscatine, Iowa.

In addition, I am a cofounder and president of the Stanley Foundation, which for years has encouraged study and education in the field of foreign relations, contributing to secure peace with freedom and justice. I have chaired over 60 national and international gatherings, including 22 Strategy for Peace conferences, 16 conferences on the United Nations of the Next Decade, 12 conferences on the United Nations Procedures, and numerous seminars focusing upon U.S. foreign policy. I have written and spoken widely on foreign policy subjects and have authored two books: *Waging Peace* (a businessman looks at U.S. foreign policy), 1956, and *Managing Global Problems* (a guide to survival), 1979.

Through the activities of the Stanley Foundation¹ and other nongovernmental organizations, I have been involved in many seminars and conferences concerned with arms control and disarmament. These activities have involved diplomats and officials from many nations, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, businessmen, academics, and arms control experts. In the course of these activities, I have studied and considered the hazards and problems related to arms control and disarmament.

I submit this testimony as an individual, not on behalf of any organization.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Assurance of national security is a basic and fundamental responsibility of our government. Security has three elements—military, economic, and political. Military power, long considered the primary source of security, will continue to be a factor, albeit of lesser importance, until nation-states become wise enough to fashion global mechanisms to maintain international peace and security.

We are now in the fourth decade of the nuclear age—an age that has revolutionized war. The holocaust of a major nuclear exchange is by far the greatest threat facing the United States. Despite the platitudes emanating from some politicians and would-be purveyors of wisdom, a Soviet-American nuclear war would be catastrophic. There would be no winner. Civilization would be ravished. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified to your committee a few days ago, a nuclear strategic exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States would be “a no win proposition” for both sides. He said the only question would be which country suffered “less catastrophic consequences.” In President Reagan’s words, “In a nuclear war all mankind would lose.”

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants nuclear war. We know this to be true. Recently Soviet President Brezhnev stated, “Only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war.” Both countries have sought for three decades to avoid nuclear war through the use of strategic nuclear deterrence. The President’s Strategic Modernization Proposal being considered by your committee is intended to reduce the likelihood of war between the two superpowers.

¹ Exhibit A lists recent Stanley Foundation conferences and publications pertaining to arms control and disarmament matters.

There is broad public support for this objective. Public opinion polls reveal overwhelming support for avoidance of nuclear war and reduction of nuclear arsenals. There is, however, substantial disagreement on the means to achieve these ends. Many who have followed arms control efforts and have studied U.S.-Soviet relations over the years have grave doubts that President Reagan's proposal will accomplish the ends he seeks.

As one who disagrees with the President's proposal, I believe that undue reliance on the military factor in the nuclear age is both shortsighted and hazardous. Despite the difficulties to be overcome, our goal should be the reversal of the arms race and the creation of an alternative global security system. Rather than embarking on a \$180 billion strategic nuclear weapons program to close the alleged "window of vulnerability," our immediate emphasis should be on negotiations and incentives to achieve substantial reduction of strategic nuclear armaments.

Reliance on greater numbers of more devastating weapons to assure security might well be characterized by the words of philosopher George Santayana, "Fanaticism consists of redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim." Our aim must be to eliminate the risk of nuclear war—to reduce rather than to expand our stockpiles of armaments.

IMPLICATIONS

The President's Strategic Modernization Proposal calls for an excessively expensive military buildup of unprecedented size, the details of which are before your committee. This gigantic buildup is intended to strengthen the security of the United States against the expanding military capability of the Soviet Union. Only after such a massive commitment to military armaments, we are told, will arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union be successful.

I believe the President's Strategic Modernization Proposal will have negative impacts upon arms control and negotiations to reduce military armaments. I believe the proposal will lessen, not improve, the security of the United States and is thus contrary to the interests of this country.

Current world conditions, coupled with the U.S. dependence on oil from the troubled Middle East—made more volatile by the tragic assassination of Anwar Sadat—undoubtedly justify altered security arrangements, modernization of our conventional military forces, and some redeployment of these forces. The proposals to greatly expand our nuclear strategic capability, however, are tragically misguided. Some of the implications of the President's proposal are examined below.

Continues the arms race

The proposed Strategic Modernization Proposal will give a powerful upward thrust to the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union, feeling threatened by it, can be counted upon to respond in kind, thus locking the super powers into an ongoing period of high risk confrontation. Moreover, superpower emphasis on strategic weapons encourages the further proliferation of nuclear weapons among threshold countries and stimulates the buildup of conventional weapons. Because there is no guarantee that greater military power will assure peace, the security of all nations, including the United States, continues in jeopardy.

Destabilizes deterrence

A continuing strategic nuclear arms race inevitably destabilizes deterrence—mutual assured destruction—the concept on which the superpowers have relied for three decades. As the nuclear arms race continues, technological development will produce weapons systems more difficult to verify. Deployment of MX missiles and other weapons intended to fight rather than deter war will stimulate interest in antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. Development of antisatellite and other space weapons will be encouraged, thus threatening the verification satellites and advance warning systems on which the superpowers now depend. Now is the time to avoid crossing technological thresholds. Let us not repeat the mistake of several years ago when the decision was made to proceed with the MIRVs rather than to halt their development by negotiation. As the array of strategic weapons expands and deterrence becomes less stable, there is an increasing probability of unwanted release of nuclear weapons by accident, systems failure, or miscalculation.

Fails to guarantee negotiating leverage

There is no assurance that more strategic weapons will improve our posture for negotiating arms reduction with the Soviet Union. Roger Fisher, professor of law

at Harvard University, has pointed out in a recent Op-Ed series in the New York Times that we decrease our negotiating leverage, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, by acquiring more weapons that we are reluctant to use due to their consequences. There is no assurance that negotiating from strength is more likely to produce meaningful arms reduction than negotiating from the current strategic parity. Negotiations are more likely to succeed if they are balanced and contribute to the mutual interests of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the nuclear hazard, to lessen the chances of military confrontation, and to reduce the economic burden of expanding military establishments.

Strains relations with allies

Relations with our allies, already undermined by economic conditions, are strained by the U.S. intent to deploy modernized Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Although Amsterdam, Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and other capital cities are closer to the Soviets than is Washington, our allies take a different view of the Soviet threat. They see not a "window of vulnerability" but a "window of opportunity" to be exploited by serious ongoing negotiations to reduce armaments. MX missiles, B-1 and Stealth bombers, neutron bombs, cruise missiles, and other weapons are not perceived by them to be the appropriate vehicles to open this window of opportunity. Failure to appreciate the genuine nature of European discontent with U.S. military policy may drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies and threaten the NATO alliance, an occurrence that would be harmful to U.S. security.

Weakens multilateral disarmament efforts

The U.S.-Soviet strategic arms race severely undermines multilateral disarmament efforts. In 1978 the Special Session on Disarmament of the U.N. General Assembly, the largest and highest level disarmament conference ever convened, adopted a Final Document incorporating important principles of disarmament and a Programme of Action. The session also revised U.S. disarmament machinery and enlarged both the governmental and nongovernmental disarmament constituency.

Planning is now under way for the Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. The U.S. strategic buildup and the expected Soviet response seriously diminish the likelihood of meaningful multilateral action on conventional arms limitation at the 1982 session. The nations of the world see no reason to disarm as long as the superpowers are expanding their arsenals.

Reduces reliance on nonmilitary solutions

The President's Strategic Modernization Proposal creates a false sense of security and leads to an undue dependence on the military approach to problem solving. U.S. security depends to no small degree on economic and political strength and influence, as well as military might. By reducing reliance on nonmilitary solutions for urgent domestic and international problems, the President's proposals reduce U.S. security.

Undermines U.S. economy

The economic implications for the United States of the proposed military buildup are very significant. The huge increase in military spending will contribute to massive deficits. Coping with inflation and high interest rates will be more difficult. The military program absorbs human as well as financial resources that are needed to stimulate the civilian economy and deal with many nonmilitary problems. The building of military weapons we do not dare to use undercuts the viability of our economy.

PROPOSALS

U.S.-Soviet military power is roughly equivalent. Each has substantial nuclear overkill to serve as a deterrent. United States and NATO forces outpoint Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and much of the Soviet military establishment protects its long border with China. The need now is to reduce rather than expand arsenals of nuclear warheads and delivery systems for raining them on each other.

The surest way to avoid the war that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wants is to pursue a two-track policy. It is inevitable that the United States and the Soviet Union will compete in the economic and political spheres. But let us promptly cooperate in the area of arms reduction to achieve important common interests.

Despite different ideologies and economies, the Soviet Union and the United States do have important common interests. Neither wants war and both would

benefit from substantial reductions in military spending. The Soviet Union needs imports from the United States, including grains and technology. The United States and its allies need resources available in the Soviet Union. Both countries would benefit from better management of global environmental problems.

It spite of our common needs, relations between the two countries have degenerated into the old cold war syndrome because of rising fears and perceptions of each other's military strength and intent. The two countries, gripped in a mutual paranoia, see each other as mortal enemies. Rather than continuing our dead end course of confrontation we must begin taking steps to increase understanding of each other. Such efforts would reduce the likelihood of war and strengthen U.S. security.

Proposals such as those discussed below would do much to advance the security of the United States.

Limit military buildup

Those elements of the Pentagon proposals concerned with strengthening our conventional forces, updating their equipment and weapons, and improving their rapid deployment capability are justified. These activities should continue. Those elements of the Pentagon budget aimed at strengthening our nuclear deterrence should be deferred until (1) there is adequate proof that the window of vulnerability exists, that it in fact is not like the supposed bomber gap and missile gap that served to stimulate military expenditures in the 1960's, and (2) serious continuing efforts to negotiate strategic arms reduction prove unsuccessful. Defer deployment of MX missiles, cancel B-1 bomber production, postpone development of space weapons and ABMs, and get on with negotiations.

Advance strategic arms negotiations

A November start for European theatre nuclear weapons limitation talks and the suggested commencement of strategic arms reduction talks (START) in March 1982 are most welcome. Much is needed, however, to raise the probability of successful negotiations and to hasten an adequate and ongoing U.S.-Soviet dialogue. The thrust of this dialogue should be toward deep cuts in strategic weapons now, not after the planned massive military buildup. The United States should advance balanced proposals responsive to the Soviet Union's military priorities as well as our own. If our proposals are completely one-sided (such as emphasizing only reduction in heavy missiles and throw weights where the Soviet Union has an advantage), they will obviously not contribute to an agreement which both sides want and need. Negotiations should seek parity, recognizing the asymmetry of the weapons systems employed by the two countries. Negotiations should seek reduction rather than limitation and should seek, as a point of departure, to freeze forces at current levels.

Improve verification procedures

The administration has properly emphasized the need for reliable verification by national means to monitor agreed force levels. Improved verification procedures would benefit both nations. Why not, even in advance of formal arms reduction negotiations, begin meetings of experts from both sides to discuss verification procedures regarding strategic weapons control, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive test ban agreement?

Pursue a comprehensive test ban agreement

Recent administrations have generally avoided the CTB, but the elements of an agreement were largely negotiated sometime ago and have long been discussed in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. Here is an opportunity to check the technological momentum feeding strategic competition and to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. We should quickly reactivate CTB negotiations with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, along with initial discussions on the verification issue.

Resume outer space negotiations

Because further militarization of outer space would be highly destabilizing and would significantly increase the risk of nuclear war, early attention to the development of a new treaty or an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is crucial. The United States should seriously consider discussion, modification, and support of the Soviet draft treaty now on the agenda of the 36th U.N. General Assembly. If this does not result in agreement, early resumption of U.S.-Soviet negotiations is urgent. The treaty or amendment needs to be broad enough to

prohibit all types of weapons capable of making outer space a potential battleground. Here is another opportunity to check the technological momentum feeding strategic competition.

Improve relation with allies

The United States needs to listen more closely to its allies and be prepared to modify positions when necessary. Our negotiating strength, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, depends to a considerable degree on shared interests among Western industrialized nations. They are telling us that the current strategic proposals are ill-advised. They are advising us to begin serious and comprehensive negotiations with the Soviet Union now.

Improve relations with the Soviet Union

Improved relations between the two nuclear giants are crucial to their mutual security. They are the key to reducing armaments, lessening the risk of war, cutting military budgets, and allowing the world to better manage its many serious non-military global problems. Improving relations between the superpowers is not a new challenge. It has been an issue since before the Soviet Union launched its first sputnik in 1957 and started to catch up with the United States in nuclear weaponry. Resumption of negotiations regarding reduction of strategic weapons, verification, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and an outer space treaty have been suggested above. Beyond this, there is need for continuing dialogue. Would not regular meetings between high-level policy-makers and military leaders of the two countries be useful? Could not such meetings, separate from detailed negotiations on specific treaties, improve understanding and reduce misperceptions of each other's intent? Would not occasional summit meetings between heads of state be useful? Are there not opportunities to utilize moratoriums, nonbinding norms, independent initiatives, and voluntary acceptance of informal restraints to stimulate reciprocal action and arms reduction? Are there not many confidence-building measures that would reduce tensions between the two countries and improve the climate for meaningful arms reduction agreements? Finding answers to these and similar questions are crucial to the security of the United States.

CONCLUSION

A world without war. That is our goal. How can we reach it? I for one do not believe the answer is to pursue a policy that continues and escalates the arms race, destabilizes deterrence, undermines our economy, and strains relations with our allies. Rather, our policy should be one of negotiation rather than confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the words of President Kennedy, "Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

The world impatiently awaits the example and leadership of the major nuclear powers for they hold the key to disarmament progress. If President Reagan chooses he can, by building on the same principles that made Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, his Republican predecessors, effective in dealing with the Kremlin, provide leadership to move the world back from the brink of nuclear disaster.

Through meetings, discussions, and negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union can break down the misperceptions that stand in the way of disarmament. Next week is none too soon to resume bilateral negotiations. Next month is none too soon for President Reagan and President Brezhnev to meet on neutral ground to discuss bold objectives and through moratoriums or joint initiatives stimulate serious disarmament progress.

Nuclear missiles and bombs will never assure the security of the United States. We would be wise to heed the advice of William Graham Sumner who wrote in 1903: "A wiser rule would be to make up your mind on what you want, peace or war, and then to get ready for what you want; for what is prepared for is what we shall get."

EXHIBIT A

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National Security and US-Soviet Relations, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., October 1981.

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National Disarmament Mechanisms, Stanley Foundation Research Study by Larry M. Ross and John R. Redick, July 1980.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SANDFORD ZEE PERSONS, WORLD FEDERALISTS ASSOCIATION, ARLINGTON, VA.

We appreciate this opportunity to submit this statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, and regret that the vicissitude of the U.S. Postal System prevented our appearing personally at your November 9 hearing because you had not received our letter requesting to be heard postmarked October 30, 1981.

I am Sandford Zee Persons, a Vice President of the World Federalists Association, and I submit this statement on behalf of the Association and its President, Norman Cousins.

When we wrote you requesting to appear personally, we at once contacted several persons in our ranks who would be qualified to speak in detail to the various parts of President Reagan's strategic weapons proposals: Dr. Jerome Wiesner of our National Advisory Board, Dr. John S. Toll, President of the University of Maryland, noted physicist, and member of our National Advisory Board, Dr. Charles C. Price, former Benjamin Franklin Professor of Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, past President of the American Chemical Society, and past President of United World Federalists, C. Maxwell Stanley, noted consulting engineer, President of The Stanley Foundation, and past President of United World Federalists, and Paul W. Walter, senior partner of Walter & Haverfield, Cleveland, Ohio and past President of United World Federalists. Fortunately, in view of the postal system's failure, none of these gentlemen were able to come to Washington, D.C. the morning of November 9 to appear. The present author claims no great expertise in the area of military hardware.

As we understand it, the fundamental rational for the MX missile is the assumption that U.S. landbased missiles are now or will soon be vulnerable to Russian intercontinental missiles. Since no tests have been made over the North Pole, in either direction, neither we nor the Russians can, with any safe measure of certainty, know that our missiles will operate with the accuracy attributed to them and which would be required to perform the job with impunity in any first strike. With experts such as Arthur G.B. Metcalf, editor of *Strategic Review*, and Dr. J. Edward Anderson of the University of Minnesota raising serious and profound questions as to whether the North Pole's magnetic field and many, many other factors would enable the Russians or ourselves to hit targets in the other's country, not to mention those experts such as George Kennan who seriously question any intent by the Russians to launch a nuclear war against us, we World Federalists believe that the national security of the United States and the personal security

of each of its citizens would be far better served if the time, brains, and funds which the President proposes to throw into the MX and his other strategic weapons system were earmarked for a Manhattan Project-sized effort to develop global security systems, using all the genius of present and developing technology, which could be used to halt the arms race, to verify internationally staged disarmament, and to demonstrate that the very science and technology which created the nuclear monster can come up with physical and human systems which will work so well and so impartially that all nations can feel secure in a warless, disarmed world in which they maintain only sufficient forces for domestic order.

To put it succinctly, we would make these four basic points:

1. So long as the United States devotes its energies to a competition in armaments, the security of its citizens will remain imperiled by the potential use of nuclear weapons against them by other nations, or by terrorists, and we will spend our wealth and our spirit in an endless, unproductive, ever-more-dangerous arms race which will sap the vitality of our national economy, as is today so evident, and fail to provide the leadership toward genuine peace, prosperity, and justice for which millions in all nations now pray, cry out, and march!

2. The only true security for the citizen and the nation in the Nuclear Age lies in the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the total abolition of war as a human institution. Since this is as true for the Russian people as it is for the American people, it is evident that if they want to achieve genuine security from nuclear missiles and future war of any nature, it is today absolutely essential that they demand that their leaders give the highest priority to negotiating an agreed plan for the staged reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and launch facilities and for the means to oversee and assure this process and to make the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the future the accepted norm of all nations.

3. Since neither nation is willing to trust the other, it is equally essential that some form of International Disarmament Organization be established in which both peoples can have confidence to oversee the process of staged disarmament and that certain provisions for inspection, verification, and control be agreed upon in advance so that both peoples can know in advance that the process will be fair and uniform and will not rely on trust alone.

4. Finally, since both Russia and America reached agreement on just such a plan in September of 1961 in the "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations" signed on September 20, 1961 by John J. McCloy for the U.S.A. and by Valerian Zorin for the U.S.S.R., it is now central to the whole issue of national security and the endless race in strategic weaponry for both nations to honor their agreement. A careful reading of this brief but comprehensive document will show that it contains all the elements required. What is needed now is the determination by both Governments to go back to the negotiating table and to give top priority to fleshing out the McCloy-Zorin Agreement into a formal treaty, no matter how long it takes, no matter how frustrating it may be, in the certain knowledge that failure will spell disaster for both the American and the Russian people and for most of their fellow citizens of Planet Earth.

We request, Mr. Chairman, that two documents be printed in the record at this point as an integral part of our statement: The text of the McCloy-Zorin Agreement, as contained in the attached advertisement in the Washington Star of June 22, 1981, and "A Human Manifesto" which was written by our much honored National President, Norman Cousins, and which speaks eloquently the beliefs of World Federalists here and in many nations regarding what is required to make sure that human life on our planet is no longer in jeopardy! I thank you and your distinguished colleagues, Mr. Chairman.

[Advertisement From the Washington Star, June 22, 1981]

TO ALL OUR FELLOW AMERICANS WHO WATCHED CBS'S "THE DEFENSE OF THE U.S."

Here is the exact text of the McCloy-Zorin Agreement:

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuances of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangement required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

A HUMAN MANIFESTO

Human life on our planet is in jeopardy.

It is in jeopardy from war that could pulverize the human habitat.

It is in jeopardy from preparations for war that destroy or diminish the prospects of decent existence.

It is in jeopardy because of the denial of human rights.

It is in jeopardy because the air is being fouled and the waters and soil are being poisoned.

It is in jeopardy because of the uncontrolled increase in population.

If these dangers are to be removed and if human development is to be assured, we the peoples of this planet must accept obligations to each other and to the generations of human beings to come.

We have the obligation to free our world of war by creating an enduring basis for worldwide peace.

We have the obligation to safeguard the delicate balances of the natural environment and to develop the world's resources for the human good.

We have the obligation to place the human interest above the national interest, and human sovereignty above national sovereignty.

We have the obligation to make human rights the primary concern of society.

We have the obligation to create a world order in which people neither have to kill nor be killed.

In order to carry out these obligations, we the people of this world assert our primary allegiance to each other in the human family. We declare our individual citizenship in the world community and our support for a United Nations capable of governing our planet in the common human interest.

This world belongs to the people who inhabit it. We have the right to change it, shape it, nurture it.

Life in the universe is unimaginably rare. It must be protected, respected, cherished.

We pledge our energies and resources of spirit to the preservation of the human habitat and to the infinite possibilities of human betterment in our time.

We, the undersigned, endorse the Human Manifesto. At the Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations, in June of 1982, we call for:

1. A Mutual freeze between the Soviet Union and the United States on all testing, development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and systems.
2. A world freeze on all testing, development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and systems.

3. Creation of an International Disarmament Organization,

- (A) To verify compliance with the above freeze.

- (B) To negotiate a treaty for general and complete disarmament, under effective international control.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER HOFFMANN, NATIONAL COCHAIRMAN,
CAMPAIGN FOR U.N. REFORM, WAYNE, N.J.

INTRODUCTION

I wish to thank the Committee for this opportunity to submit the recommendations of the Campaign for U.N. Reform with regard to U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy.

It is unfortunate that some of the testimony that has been heard by this committee has tended to compound fears in Europe that the United States is prepared to fight a so-called "limited" nuclear war. We would urge the Committee to acknowledge the dangers inherent in any such policy and to press this Administration to propose instead new initiatives capable of leading to meaningful arms control and disarmament agreements under effective international verification machinery. This, plus steps to improve the effectiveness of international peace-keeping and peacemaking capabilities, should be the cornerstone of U.S. strategic nuclear policy.

There can be no question that U.S. national security, the security of our NATO allies, and indeed, the security of all humankind, must be the basis on which U.S. strategic nuclear policy is formulated. But a valid question which we hope this committee will address, is what constitutes security in a nuclear age?

To this end, we hope to convince you of the truth of the following contentions:

1. A continually escalating arms race is a threat to human survival and therefore can never provide this or any country with lasting national security.

2. The arms program the President has proposed could actually jeopardize rather than add to our national security.

3. We have a better alternative, which is to go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a new SALT agreement that will enhance our security. We should insist that such an agreement include the establishment of an international verification agency with on-site inspection powers to supplement national technical means of verification.

4. To succeed in providing long range world security, a new SALT agreement should be followed by international arms control and disarmament negotiations conducted in accordance with the principles agreed to by the United States and U.S.S.R. 20 years ago in a document they signed called the "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations." Known as the McCloy-Zorin Agreement, these principles include a call for strengthening international dispute settlement procedures and international peacekeeping capabilities, and the establishment of on-site inspection capability without the impediment of the veto.

5. To help obtain these goals, the United States should prepare and submit a proposal for the establishment of an International Verification Agency to the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament scheduled to begin in June, 1982. The United States should also support The Netherlands in its call to study the establishment of an International Disarmament Agency, and lend support to the French proposal for the creation of a World Satellite Monitoring Agency.

6. Because proposals for controlling arms and eventually disarming depend on settling disputes between nations peacefully and maintaining peace, the United States should also initiate and support proposals that would improve the United Nations' ability to settle international disputes through conciliation, mediation and arbitration by providing for specific step-by-step procedures for conflict resolution. The United States should also continue to press for the creation of a U.N. Peacekeeping Reserve of earmarked national contingents, as recommended by the United States Government in 1978.

We would like to elaborate further on each of these points:

I. WHAT CONSTITUTES SECURITY IN A NUCLEAR AGE?

Most American leaders in the nuclear age have commented on the danger of relying on nuclear arms for security. For instance, John F. Kennedy said: "Our defenses shrink as our armaments increase." Henry Kissinger asked: "What in God's name does nuclear superiority mean? . . . How do you get it? What do you do with it when you have it, when each side can completely destroy the other?"

From 1959 to 1960 the world spent less than \$100 billion a year globally on the arms race. Today we are spending over \$500 billion. Since 1960 we have been engaged not only in a race in numbers of nuclear weapons, but in technology as well. In most cases the race in technology has been precipitated by the United States. We were the first to launch the Polaris; first to have the MIRV; first to successfully test and launch the Poseidon missile. And yet today, we are not secure; some even express concern that Russian technology has or will shortly outstrip our own. Two decades of substantial military spending, advanced technological developments and we find ourselves no more secure, indeed, some contend less secure, than when we started.

We submit that the continued growth of nuclear technology and armaments will lead eventually to their use. We live daily with the threat that an accident, a madman or a miscalculation of national wills may lead to a confrontation in which no one is willing to back down, triggering a nuclear holocaust. Dare we call this security? Bertrand Russell wrote an epitaph for humankind which reads "Ever since Adam and Eve ate the apple, man has never refrained from any folly of which he was capable. The end."

We urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to formulate policies that will avoid the ultimate folly of nuclear self-destruction. This committee must not allow our government to go on depending increasingly on deadly nuclear armaments for our security, for there can be no security in obliteration. The reality is that each time one superpower improves its nuclear defense or offense the other will respond in kind. The costs will increase. Other nations will join in the race. Domestic economies will suffer. The risk of nuclear war will increase. And our chances of survival and our national security will decline.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED ARMS PROGRAM FURTHER JEOPARDIZES NATIONAL SECURITY

President Reagan has recommended that we proceed to develop the MX missile without closing the so-called "window of vulnerability" to a first-strike, surprise attack against us which we say we are concerned will shortly be within Russian capability. Anthony Lewis, writing on the editorial page of *The New York Times*, November 2nd, pointed out that under these conditions the MX missile cannot be regarded as a retaliatory weapon at all and that it will be seen by the Soviets as a threat, giving the United States a first-strike capability of its own. In this regard, Lewis writes, "The point is that in the nuclear arms field nothing done by either superpower can be viewed by it solely in its own terms. The way the other side may perceive a development cannot be safely ignored, because the consequences are too serious."

In September 1978, Colonel Donald J. Stukel of the U.S. Air Force in a National Security Affairs Monograph, "Technology and Arms Control," wrote, "More armaments do not necessarily guarantee more security. Depending on the type of arms, they may, in fact, have an opposite effect by providing the other party with an incentive to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis, or to undertake major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a strategic disadvantage." It would seem President Reagan's decision to build a vulnerable MX puts it in this category and will tend to jeopardize rather than stabilize our nuclear security in the years ahead.

In this regard Senator Mark Hatfield recently said, "The vital strategic questions surrounding deployment of the MX missile address the missiles clear first-strike threat against an enormous percentage of the Soviet missile force . . . causing a fundamental destabilizing of nuclear policy in times of crisis and increasing the risk of accidental or preemptive nuclear war initiated by an edgy Soviet leadership."

III. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE: SALT AGREEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION

We think Senator Gary Hart was on the right track when he said, "The Reagan Administration has linkage backwards. The only linkage that makes sense is linkage between our distrust of the Russians' intentions and the need for an arms treaty that limits their capability."

Rather than proceeding with the development of the MX missile, we should be controlling and eliminating the deployment of MIRVs and cruise missiles. We will never be able to do so, however, without first putting in place a supplemental on-site inspection system that can insure that any agreement that is reached will be observed. While it may be possible to verify compliance with agreements to limit the number of huge landbased launching systems through satellite photography and other national technical means, some form of supplemental on-site inspection is essential to secure agreements limiting the number, or distance capability, of cruise missiles; production on nuclear bombs or requiring the dismantling of existing nuclear stockpiles.

To pave the way for such agreements, the Campaign for U.N. Reform has proposed to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that it support the establishment of an International Verification Agency with the authority to make on-site inspections. As proposed, the IVA would be used to supplement, not replace, national technical means of verification. We understand our proposal, which we are attaching in full as an Addendum to this statement, has recently been submitted by the White House to the National Security Council for its review. Although our complete text is attached, I would like to summarize some of the advantages that an International Verification Agency would offer over a system of bilateral on-site inspection:

1. For the United States and U.S.S.R. to negotiate meaningful arms reduction agreements, at some point they each will have to be assured that other nations (China, for example) are not developing significant nuclear weapons capabilities that will threaten the stability of any region. Other countries will eventually have to be brought into these agreements for this reason, which will require an international agency. Setting one up from the beginning will facilitate this process.

2. If a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union is reached, we would both want to be sure that nuclear weapons technology is not transferred to "client" states. It would therefore be in both our interests to bring as many countries

under the jurisdiction of an international verification agency as possible. By the way, precedence for on-site inspections have already been set in the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as in the U.S.-Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE).

3. Disagreements as to violations are less likely to become deadlocked if neutral parties other than the United States and U.S.S.R. are involved in the inspection procedures.

4. Inspection by small, non-nuclear nations would offer safer inspections from a national security viewpoint than mutual, bilateral inspections.

In a statement to the Foreign Policy Association on July 14th of this year, Secretary of State Haig said "We will seek arms control agreements that include effective means of verification and mechanisms for securing compliance . . . the critical obstacle in virtually every area of arms control in the 1970's was Soviet unwillingness to accept verification measures needed for more ambitious limitations." On November 4, 1981 The New York Times printed excerpts of an interview with Leonid Brezhnev and the West German new magazine Der Spiegel. On the issue of verification, Brezhnev said, in part: ". . . We, too, want to be certain that United States fulfills its obligations. Therefore we are interested in verification no less than the United States—and maybe even more." "The effectiveness of these means of observation, including space technology, is continually being improved so that the applicability of national means is increasing. The American administration certainly knows this. *But if mutual trust is achieved, other forms of verification can also be developed.* . . ."

The emphasis is ours. We think the door is open for bold initiatives if our Administration is ready to enter a new era of nuclear strategy that encompasses effective control of nuclear armaments, rather than their escalation.

IV. MOVING TOWARD REAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE

It is amazing how far backwards we have moved since the 1960's. In 1961 John J. McCloy, for the United States, and Valerin Zorin, for the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement that contained the following principles:

1. Goal of General Disarmament to be accompanied by reliable dispute settlement procedures and peacekeeping arrangements.
2. States to have only such non-nuclear forces as necessary to maintain internal order.
3. Dismantling of military establishment, including elimination of nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems.
4. Implementation of disarmament by stages, with each stage carried out within specified time limits.
5. Balanced Disarmament, so that no State can gain a military advantage at any time.
6. Strict and effective international control under an International Disarmament Organization, assured of unrestricted access without veto to all places.
7. Measures to strengthen dispute settlement and peacekeeping institutions, including the obligation of States to contribute manpower or an international peace force.
8. Negotiations to seek widest possible agreement at earliest possible date.

Unfortunately, nothing came of these disarmament proposals, because neither side was really ready for the "general and complete disarmament" they envisaged. As a result, the Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has now reached four minutes to midnight. It is time we turned the clock back to 1961 and tried to put in place a system of international disarmament and security that will insure that succeeding generations of Americans will have the chance to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

V. STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN NOW

We have already mentioned that our proposal to create an International Verification Agency has been submitted to the Administration and is being reviewed. We would urge you to support its submission to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in June of 1982 as a positive step toward obtaining international support for this concept and creating the right atmosphere for a successful conclusion of a new comprehensive, far-reaching SALT agreement. Along these lines we would also urge you to view favorably the Netherlands call to study the creation of a Disarmament Organization and the French proposal for a World Satellite Monitoring Agency.

VI. ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF WORLD SECURITY

We must always keep in mind that the development of alternative means for resolving disputes by means other than war is an essential ingredient for meaningful arms limitations and arms reductions. Provisions will need to be made to settle disputes over the interpretations of arms control and disarmament agreements, as well as to resolve disputes which can lead to war if allowed to fester. Two mechanisms exist in the present U.N. Charter for resolving disputes, but both are inadequate in their present state of development. Article 33 mandates that the parties attempt to resolve disputes through conciliation, mediation and arbitration, but there is no trained conciliation or mediation service within the U.N. framework, nor is there a current U.N. Arbitration Panel. Suggestions for correcting these deficiencies were made some time ago by the Philippine Government to the Special U.N. Committee on the Charter and on Strengthening the Role of the Organization, but nothing has happened. More modest proposals for a U.N. Mediation Service are now being considered by this committee. It behooves the United States to support such proposals and to work to get them approved. Certainly, the U.N. could have benefitted from such standing mediation facilities had they existed when our hostages were taken by Iran. There are signs our government may be beginning to recognize this, and may be more forthcoming in supporting such initiatives than they have been in the past. We would certainly encourage the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to lend its support to the creation of a U.N. Mediation Service.

The other mechanism within the U.N. system for resolving disputes is the International Court of Justice. Composed of fifteen judges who sit at the The Hague, it unfortunately hears only one or two cases a year which nations agree to submit to it. One reason for its non-use is that many nations (including the United States) have attached stringent reservations which permit each nation to decide on a case by case basis whether to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. This needs to change, and the Senate could help change it, by repealing the Connelly amendment which limits U.S. participation in the Court.

Another essential ingredient for national security is a strong international peacekeeping force to prevent hostilities from erupting during the dispute-settlement process. The U.N. Charter envisages a U.N. Army, not the small ad hoc peacekeeping arrangements that were used by the U.N. in the Suez, Congo and Cyprus crises. President Carter supported the creation of a large U.N. Peacekeeping Reserve of earmarked national contingents. We hope the new Administration will do so as well, and will succeed in getting it established.

Disarmament cannot be discussed in a cocoon or in a vacuum. It is, as we have suggested, intertwined with the viability of international institutions. In the long run, attempts to control or reduce arms cannot succeed without the creation of effective international verification procedures and adoption of substantial reforms in the peacemaking and peacekeeping part of the U.N. system. I am appending the Campaign's brochure "Disarmament and the U.N. System. Three Related Proposals Essential for World Security," which gives more detail on the Campaign's recommendations in this regard.

In similar fashion, American nuclear strategic policy does not exist in a vacuum. Each decision we reach will be analyzed and reacted to by the U.S.S.R. and others. Unless we can reach agreement with the Soviets to control the nuclear arms race, we can expect that more and more non-nuclear nations will refuse to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mexico has already made some public statements in this regard.

Time is not on our side. Recently, our organization helped gather over 17,000 signatures in a short period of time calling for a bilateral and then a world freeze on all testing, development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and systems; and the creation of an International Disarmament Organization to verify compliance with such a freeze; and to encourage negotiations toward a treaty for general and complete disarmament, under effective international controls. We are not interested in unilateral disarmament. We do not want to see a weakening of American security. But we are concerned with the survival of Americans and of all human beings. That is why our project was called the Caravan for Human Survival.

When the first stage of our Caravan project was completed, we visited the Disarmament Centre of the United Nations with a representative contingent of student leaders that had been involved in the effort to collect signatures on the Caravan petition. One of the students, Forrest Bittner of Duke University, con-

tended that one reason we see so much alcohol and drug abuse amongst our young people is because so many of them are desperate to escape from the reality of the world situation, so threatening to their survival. Those students who became involved in the petition drive, he said, were indicating their "faith that human destiny is too great to allow the disagreement of a few to destroy it."

Today we place our faith in the leadership of this Committee. We implore you to fashion a strategic nuclear policy that will assure our survival and not hasten the day of our destruction. In part at least, the decisions and the consequences of these decisions, are in your hands.

